. 


• 


UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA 
AT   LOS  ANGELES 


ROBERT  ERNEST   COWAN 


VIEWS 


COMMODORE  GEORGE  W.  MELVILLE, 


(HUM     K>T(.lXEETt    OF    THE    XAVY, 


AS   TO 


THK  STRATEGIC  AND  COMMERCIAL  VALUE  OF  Till-   NtCARACI'AN 

CANAL,  THE  1'TiTRE  CONTROL  OF  THE  PACIFIC  OCEAN, 

THE  STRATEGIC  VALUE  OF  HAWAII,  AND  ITS 

ANNEXATION  TO  THE  UNITED  STATES. 


WASHINGTON: 

MKXT     Pi 
18'. 


VIEWS 


OF 


COMMODORE  GEORGE  W.  MELVILLE, 


CHIEF    ENGINEEll    OF    THE    NAVY, 


AS  TO 


THE  STRATEGIC  AND  COMMERCIAL  VALUE  OF  THE  NICARAGUAN 

CANAL,  THE  FUTURE  CONTROL  OF  THE  PACIFIC  OCEAN, 

THE  STRATEGIC  VALUE  OF  HAWAII,  AND  ITS 

ANNEXATION  TO  THE  UNITED  STATES. 


WASHINGTON: 

GOVERNMENT    PRINTING    OFFICE. 
'  1898. 


~*J?Jj 

U.A2.3  0 


VIEWS  OF  COMMODORE  GEORGE  W.  MELVILLE. 


OUR  FUTURE  ON  THE  PACIFIC. 
WHAT  WE  HAVE  THERE   TO   HOLD  AND  WIN. 

The  closing  years  of  the  century  seem  to  be,  in  all  lands  save  our 
own,  years,  not  of  war,  but  of  a  strenuous  making  ready  for  it.  Alsace 
and  Loraine,  the  Eastern  question  in  its  many  varied  phases,  and  the 
jealous  rivalry  as  to  colonies  and  dependencies,  make  continental 
Europe  but  a  camp,  with  more  than  3,000,000  men  constantly  under 
arms.  England  is  yet  quenching  the  flame  of  revolt  which  flashed 
among  the  wild  tribes  of  her  Indian  frontier;  and,  in  the  Soudan,  too, 
she  is  marching  on.  Spain  drains  her  uttermost  resources  for  Cuba's 
fading  tenure.  In  the  far  East,  with  China's  sudden  fall,  the  bal- 
ance of  power  has  been  disturbed,  and  the  throb  of  the  war  drum 
seems  not  yet  stilled  but  muffled  only,  until  Korea's  tale  shall  be  fully 
told.  "There  never  was  a  time  in  the  history  of  the  world,"  General 
Miles  has  said,  "when  so  much  energy,  ingenuity,  and  wealth  were 
being  expended  to  maintain  large  standing  armies." 

On  the  sea  there  sounds  the  same  foreboding  note.  Great  Britain, 
despite  her  matchless  naval  array  at  the  jubilee,  will  have  under  con- 
struction during  the  present  fiscal  year  over  100  vessels.  France,  with 
many  now  building,  will  lay  down  others,  aggregating  45,000  tons  dis- 
placement. Germany  plans  a  modest  increase  in  a  battleship,  some 
gunboats,  and  torpedo  craft ;  but  the  Kaiser's  eager  insistance  on  a  great 
sea  force  is  widely  known.  Russia — silent,  mysterious — moves  swiftly 
in  her  upbuilding  as  a  naval  power,  not  only  in  armor  clads,  but  in 
cruisers  of  great  steaming  radius.  Japan  is  executing  a  programme 
which  will  give  her  navy  a  total  addition  of  200,000  tons.  Even  China, 
whose  ships  went  as  sheep  to  the  slaughter,  dreams  of  a  fleet,  revived, 
ami  is  said  to  be  considering  estimates  for  its  creation. 

Only  the  United  States  moves  slowly,  calm  in  the  consciousness  of 
peace,  although  the  Chilean  and  Venezuelan  affairs,  the  undying  strife 
in  Cuba  at  her  doors,  and  the  cloud,  "  the  size  of  a  man's  hand,"  in 
Hawaii,  have  given  fearful  warning  that  the  "detached  and  distant 
situation,"  of  which  Washington  wrote,  will  shield  her  no  longer  from 
international  complication  and,  it  may  be,  conflict. 

THE  MARINE  ENGINE  AND  MODERN  NAVAL  STRATEGY. 

It  has  been  well  said  that  "with  the  development  of  the  marine 
engine  the  sea  unites  rather  than  divides  widely  separated  lands,"  and 
to  this  it  may  be  added  that  the  swift  progress  of  steam  in  marine  pro- 
pulsion has  been  a  most  potent  factor  in  shaping  the  exterior  policy  of 
maritime  nations,  and  still  more  in  modifying,  not  the  principles,  but 
the  scope  and  methods  of  naval  strategy. 

3 


41H567 


On  the  land  rails  of  steel  traversing  valley,  plain,  and  mountain  make 
easy  the  path  of  the  Hying  express  and  the  fast  freight,  which  together 
conquer  time  and  distance  in  the  binding  into  a  homogeneous  whole  of 
the  many  States  which  form  a  Republic  almost  continental  in  extent; 
but  the  railroad  is  fixed,  a  permanent  way,  whose  direction  varies  only 
with  new  constructions.  The  sea,  on  the  contrary,  gives  a  track — 
fluid,  mobile,  universal — which  turns  wherever  swift  prows  may  point, 
and  on  which  massive  hulls,  much  too  huge  for  any  form  of  land  transit, 
may  pass  with  ease  from  port  to  port. 

Moreover,  when  in  1805 — nine  years  after  Washington  wrote  of 
America's  "distant  situation" — Xelson  "chased  half  around  the  world 
a  French  fleet  nearly  twice  the  force  of  his  own,  scared  by  the  very 
terror  of  his  name,"  his  fierce  ardor  fretted  itself  to  fury  with  his  ships, 
which  through  a  run  of  7,000  miles  of  sea  averaged  but  93  miles  a 
day,  or  less  than  4  knots  an  hour. 

"Salt  beef  and  the  French  fleet  are  better  than  roast  beef  and  cham- 
pagne without  it,"  said  the  great  Admiral  in  beginning  his  stern  chase, 
lie  found  that  fleet,  and  with  it  death;  but  in  the  finding,  through 
those  lagging  months,  while  drifting  or  beating  over  those  leagues  of 
sea,  he  must  have  felt  to  the  full  the  limits  which  stinted  the  sea 
power  of  his  time. 

Steam  has  changed  all  this.  Over  the  same  western  ocean  which 
Kelson,  bitterly  impatient,  crossed  and  recrossed  so  slowly  in  1805,  the 
United  States  cruiser  Columbia  swept,  ninety  years  later,  at  a  speed  of 
18.41  knots  per  hour,  or  four  and  three-quarter  times  that  of  the  ships 
which,  dull  sailers  though  they  may  have  been,  were  very  sure  and 
deadly  iu  their  work  at  Trafalgar. 

This  passage,  in  its  sustained  speed  through  such  a  distance,  was  not 
only  a  triumph,  yet  unequaled,  for  American  naval  engineering — it  was 
as  well  a  flashing  illumination  of  the  strategic  fact  that  America's  isola- 
tion, militarily,  from  European  and  Asian  nations  had  diminished  in 
this  age  in  most  marked  degree.  While  it  is  not  yet  possible  for  the 
performance  of  the  swift  Columbia  to  be  equaled  in  a  trans- Atlantic  run 
by  armored  battle  ships,  it  seems  quite  certain  that  Nelson's  speed  can 
be  increased  nearly  threefold,  and  that  at  this  increased  speed  and 
within  two  weeks  a  European  fleet  of  any  required  strength  could  be 
thrown  upon  our  Atlantic  coasts  with  one-third  of  its  coal  supply 
remaining. 

GEOGRAPHIC   ISOLATION  NOT  A  SAFEGUARD. 

The  geographic  isolation,  apparent  or  real,  of  any  people  has  never 
yet  been  respected  by  superior  forces.  It  forms  no  sure  guard  when,  in 
peace  or  war,  the  nations  of  the  earth  come  knocking  at  the  door. 
Ancient  Peru — peaceful,  rich,  un warlike — was  many  leagues  from  Spain, 
and  between  them  the  waves  of  two  oceans  rolled.  Yet  there  came 
Pizarro  and  his  adventurers,  soldiers  less  of  Spain  than  of  the  lust  of 
gold.  The  Inca  fell,  and  the  land  was  stripped  of  its  fatal  wealth;  its 
people  were  enslaved,  and  in  slaughter,  torture,  and  rapine  a  noble 
civilization  perished. 

In  later  times,  China,  arrogant  and  ignorant,  learned,  in  a  measure, 
the  same  lesson.  While  her  officials  babbled  of  invading  England  over- 
land through  Russia,  the  war  of  1840  was  waged  against  her  by  the 
people  of  that  small  island,  parted  from  her  by  a  hemisphere ;  and  that 
war  wrested  Hongkong  from  her  shore  line,  seized  in  indemnity 
$21,000,000  from  her  treasury,  and  by  force  opened  five  of  her  ports  to 
the  commerce  of  the  world. 


These  examples,  it  is  true,  come  from  the  conflicts  of  higher  civiliza- 
tions with  those  differing  from  them  more  in  kind  than  in  degree;  but  the 
world's  annals  arc  not  bare  of  similar  illustrations  from  the  wars  of  less 
unequal  toes.  While  in  its  ending  our  own  story  brought  victory,  not 
defeat,  it  is  yet  well  to  remember  that  during  the  Revolution  there  were 
landed  in  America  nearly  50,000  foreign  troops;  that  in  lh<>  war  of  181U 
British  forces  of  nearly  25,000  men  attacked  the  territory  of  the  United 
States;  that  her  ports  were  blockaded,  and  that  iu  1814  her  Capitol  was 
burned. 

If,  then,  it  be  admitted  that  the  safeguard  which  the  detached  situa- 
tion of  the  United  States  has  given  her  grows  weaker  with  every 
advance  in  the  methods  of  sea  communications;  if  no  more  she  watches 
from  afar,  in  security  and  peace,  the  growth  and  strife  of  over-sea  peo- 
ples as  alien  largely  to  her  own  interests  and  progress;  if  the  "Titan  of 
the  West  "is  no  longer  "behind  a  thousand  leagues  of  foam  secure,1' 
then  it  would  appear  to  be  the  part,  not  only  of  national  wisdom,  but  of 
national  salvation,  to  conserve  and  fortify  that  which  remains  to  her  of 
advantage  in  location  by  adequate  coast  defenses,  by  a  powerful  fleet, 
and  by  the  occupation  as  opportunity  shall  come  of  outlying  islands, 
her  shore  line's  frontier  posts. 

WEALTH  OF  THE  PACIFIC  STATES. 

"  Imperial  in  extent  and  of  extraordinary  growth,"  so  said  James  G. 
Elaine,  in  1881,  of  our  possessions  on  the  Pacific  coast,  adding  that  the 
territory  dependent  on  that  ocean  for  commercial  outlet  comprised  "an 
area  of  nearly  800,000  square  miles,  larger  iu  extent  than  the  German 
Empire  and  the  four  Latin  countries  of  Europe  combined.'' 

These  strong  words  find  but  emphasis  and  amplification  in  the  strik- 
ing discussion  of  our  national  statistics  presented  recently  in  the  North 
American  Keview  by  Mr.  Michael  G.  Mulhall,  F.  S.  S.,  of  England. 
The  total  wealth,  in  the  year  1890,  of  the  eleven  States  included  by  him 
in  the  Pacific  group,  he  gives  as  0,811  millions  of  dollars,  or  $2,31*8  per 
inhabitant.  With  but  (>  per  cent  of  the  population  of  the  Union,  they 
hold  10  per  cent  of  its  wealth.  Their  railway  mileage  is  greater  than 
that  "of  any  European  state  except  France  or  Germany,  and  their  wealth 
exceeds  that  of  Sweden,  Norway,  and  Denmark,  in  the  aggregate." 

While,  during  the  forty-four  years  ending  with  1893,  they  produced 
nearly  2,400  tons  of  gold  and  over  30,000  tons  of  silver,  having  a  total 
value  of  nearly  3,000  millions  of  dollars,  analysis  shows  that  these 
States  are  not  mining  camps,  and  that  their  swift  growth  dates  not 
from  the  days  of  '49  but  from  the  year  1870.  At  that  time  their  pos- 
sessions were  valued  at  727  millions  of  dollars.  During  the  two 
decades  which  followed  their  wealth  increased  ninefold,  to  the  magnifi- 
cent total  already  stated,  of  which  mining  properties  form  but  8  per 
cent. 

Of  profound  importance  is  the  fact  that  the  richest  portion  of  this 
territory  is  that  which  is  most  exposed  to  blockade,  raids,  bombard- 
ment, and  the  lossep  and  suffering  which  attend  warfare  or  invasion 
from  the  sea.  Three  only  of  these  eleven  States  lie  upon  the  coast — 
California,  Oregon,  and  Washington;  and  these  three  hold,  of  the  total 
wealth  of  the  group,  57  per  cent,  or  3,885  millions  of  dollars;  2,534  of 
the  millions  are  the  share  of  California,  the  "isle  of  many  jewels  an'd 
much  gold  "of  the  old  Spanish  romance — a  title  which  seems  hardly 
apt,  since,  while  her  mines  are  valued  at  83  millions  of  dollars,  her 
buildings  and  farms  reach  1,740  millions,  owing,  doubtless,  to  a  soil 


and  climate  which  give  her  vineyards  of  30,000  acres  and  fruit  gardens 
the  most  extensive  and  productive  in  the  Union. 

The  slender  share  which  the  United  States  has  won  thus  far  in  trans- 
pacific trade  is  shown  by  the  fact  that,  although  San  Francisco  is  the 
seventh  city  of  the  Union  in  population,  there  passed  through  the 
Golden  Gate  in  the  year  ending  June  30,  1890,  but  4.39  per  cent  of  our 
total  import  and  export  trade,  with  shipping  entries  of  1,200,000  tons. 
The  Pacific  coast  as  a  whole  is  credited  with  a  share  of  this  total  trade, 
amounting,  during  the  year  as  above,  to  5.69  per  cent. 

ALASKA. 

Linked  far  more  with  the  future  than  with  the  present  of  the  Union 
is  the  Territory  of  Alaska,  Al  ak-shak,  "the  great  laud"  of  the  abo- 
rigines. Purchased  from  Kussia  in  1867  for  7J  millions  of  dollars,  this 
Territory,  for  long  years  discredited,  bids  fair  to  repeat,  in  part,  the 
history  of  California,  and,  from  the  products  of  its  mines  alone,  to 
repay  many  times  over  its  relatively  trifling  cost.  Years,  not  distant 
but  at  hand,  will  more  than  vindicate  the. judgment  and  foreknowledge 
of  the  great  Secretary,  whose  name  will  live  in  the  history  of  the  wide 
lands  he  acquired  in  the  far  north. 

With  an  area — including  those  of  its  coast  islands  and  the  Aleutian 
Archipelago — of  580,170  square  miles,  Alaska  is  nearly  six  and  one-half 
times  the  size  of  the  States  of  New  York  and  Pennsylvania  combined. 
On  Bering  Sea  and  the  Arctic  and  Pacific  oceans  it  has  a  coast  line 
of  4,750  statute  miles.  The  perennial  friction  over  its  seal  fisheries 
clouds  the  worth  of  other  resources  far  more  valuable.  In  its  wide- 
spreading  forests  of  cedar,  pine,  hemlock,  and  fir  there  is  a  world's 
supply  to  draw  on  when  other  sections  fail,  while  its  catch  of  salmon, 
cod,  and  other  food-fishes  is,  in  amount  and  quality,  unexcelled,  if 
equaled,  elsewhere. 

Alaska  is,  in  effect,  an  over-sea  province,  separated  from  the  Union 
not  only  by  British  Columbia,  but  in  great  part  by  a  long  stretch  of 
ocean.  Excluding  the  narrow  strip  along  the  coast  of  the  continent, 
the  air-line  distance  from  San  Francisco  to  the  nearest  point  of  its  com- 
pact area  is -fully  as  great  as  that  to  the  Hawaiian  Islands,  or  over 
2,000  miles.  To  Atton,  the  farthest  island  of  the  Aleutian  group,  this 
distance  is  doubled.  The  development  and  protection  of  this  imposing 
and  most  valuable  territory  will  give  problems  for  the  future  far  from 
easy  of  solution. 

THE  DEVELOPMENT   OF  THE  PACIFIC   OCEAN. 

As  with  the  Pacific  States,  the  development  of  the  vast  ocean  which 
they  confront,  the  largest  and  noblest  body  of  water  on  the  globe,  has 
been  not  slow  and  lingering,  but  almost  wholly  deferred  until  a  recent 
period.  To  the  comparative  inaccessibility  of  its  seas  the  long  waiting 
must  be  ascribed  in  great  degree.  It  can  not  be  doubted  that  if  nature 
had  but  cleft  a  waterway  through  the  American  isthmus,  the  growth 
of  the  Pacific  to  the  northeast  and  the  south  would  have  begun  almost 
with  the  coining  of  Columbus. 

But  this  was  not  to  be.  Barred  on  the  southeast  by  the  stormy 
terrors  of  Cape  Horn,  its  northern  portals  were  blocked,  seemingly  for 
all  time,  by  the  polar  floes.  More  than  two  hundred  attempts  were 
made  to  double  the  Arctic  coast  of  America  before  Franklin's  men  laid 
down  their  lives  in  "  forging  the  last  link  of  the  Northwest  Passage." 

The  Northeast  Passage  has  a  story,  not  so  continuous,  but  lacking 


not  one  whit  in  the  fortitude  and  daring  of  the  stern  seamen  who  there 
C--.;IY» •<!  the  Arctic  Highway,  whose  lofty  purpose  held  "either  to  bring 
that  to  pass  which  was  intended,  or  else  to  die  the  death."  Sir 
Hugh  Willonghby,  in  1553,  led  the  van,  sailing  for  those  unknown  seas 
to  tind,  not  the  passage,  but  slow  death  in  the  White  North.  It  was 
left  ior  Nordenskiold,  nearly  four  centuries  later,  to  complete  the  task 
begun  by  that  heroic  sailor. 

And  so,  through  the  ages,  the  eastern  and  southern  Pacific  slept  on 
in  primeval  peace,  its  dark  waves  unvexed  by  any  alien  keel,  while  to 
the  westward  empires,  kingdoms,  and  republics  rose  and  fell.  \Vith 
the  dawn  of  the  modern  era  there  sailed  the  Genoese — dreaming  but 
prophetic — "to  add  a  new  hemisphere  to  our  globe  ;"  and  in  1513,  from 
the  peak  in  Darien,  Balboa,  the  conquistador,  looked  on  the  unknown 
ocean.  Eight  years  later  Magellan  passed  through  his  fog -en  shrouded 
straits  and  a  European  keel  first  cleft  its  waters.  Through  the  labors 
of  those  who  followed — from  Drake  to  Vancouver,  but  most  notably 
of  Cook — the  work  of  discovery,  and  to  some  extent  of  colonization, 
went  on. 

Progress,  however,  was  so  slow  that,  in  the  year  1830,  it  was  esti- 
mated that  there  were  not  more  than  5(H)  men  of  Anglo-Saxon  race 
west  of  the  Sierra  Nevada  on  the  continental  shore ;  much  of  the  island 
territory  of  the  South  Seas  was  little  known  and  yet  unclaimed,  and 
as  to  Australia,  not  until  1845  was  there  dispelled  the  error  that  there 
existed  within  its  borders  a  great  inland  sea. 

Within  a  decade  or  little  more,  however,  the  full  awakening  of  the 
Pacific  seems  to  have  come.  The  outward  surge  of  the  nations  of  the 
Old  WTorld,  so  marked  in  its  effects  upon  the  African  continent,  has 
sent  as  well  waves  of  unrest  over  the  placid  ocean,  which  have  broken 
on  the  shores  of  its  uttermost  island.  Long  ago,  W7illiam  H.  Seward, 
in  addressing  the  United  States  Senate,  said,  as  to  the  commerce,  poli- 
tics, thought,  and  activities  of  Europe,  that  they  would  "ultimately 
sink  in  importance,  while  the  Pacific  Ocean,  its  shores,  its  islands,  and 
the  vast  regions  beyond,  will  become  the  chief  theater  of  events  in  the 
world's  great  hereafter." 

Realization,  more  or  less  full,  of  this  seems  to  have  created,  as  to  the 
southern  Pacific,  in  these  recent  years,  a  feverish  hunger  for  island 
territory,  whose  ravenous  desire  fails  only  with  that  on  which  it  feeds. 
In  1885  Germany  (whose  greed  for  Samoa  has  been  so  open  and  so 
strong)  annexed  the  great  Marshall  group,  midway  between  the  Aus- 
tralian steamship  lines  from  British  Columbia  and  the  possible  Asian 
lines  of  the  future  from  the  Isthmus;  France  added  to  her  large  pos- 
sessions in  New  Caledonia  and  the  Society  Islands  by  taking  the  Mar- 
quesas Islands  and  the  Low  Archipelago;  and  Great  Britain  has 
declared  protectorates  over  island  after  island  and  group  after  group — 
the  Gilbert,  Ellice,  Phoenix,  and  many  others — all  on,  or  near  and  flank- 
ing, her  steam  routes  from  British  Columbia  to  Australia  and  New 
Zealand.  Her  flag  thus  floats  over  most  of  the  territory  of  the  southern 
Pacific,  and  is  seen  as  far  north  as  Johnston  Island,  600  miles  from 
Hawaii. 

Only  the  United  States  has  stood  aloof,  holding  Samoa  with  reluc- 
tant hand  and  turning  wholly  from  Hawaii,  while  other  nations  have 
acquired  territoryin  those  waters  which  covers  and  guards  the  commerce 
of  the  coming  years.  "  While  we  have  been  talking  in  our  sleep  about 
Hawaii,"  a  keen  observer  notes,  "England  has  occupied  and  possessed 
a  score  of  islands  in  the  greatest  of  the  oceans."  There  may  come  a 
time  when  the  sons  of  a  Greater  United  States  will  deplore,  as  slum- 


8 

/ 

brous  unwisdom,  the  policy  of  to-day,  since,  in  a  commercial  and 
strategic  sense,  Ultima  Thule  itself  would  seem  to  Lave  been  seized  in 
the  South  Seas. 

In  striking  array,  the  Hon.  John  R.  Procter  has  marshaled  the  politi- 
cal changes  that  have  come,  in  these  recent  years,  to  Pacific  and 
Indian  shores  and  islands,  with  their  potent  effects  on  the  patr  which 
the  great  ocean,  its  lands  and  peoples,  shall  play  hereafter  in  the  world- 
wide drama  of  inter  national  life  and  strife.  He  has  said: 

The  presence  of  Russia  in  the  Far  East  and  the  possibility  of  a  combination 
between  Russia  and  China,  followed  by  the  awakening  of  China  from  her  sleep  of 
centuries;  the  extension  of  French  dominion  in  Indo-China,  Slant,  and  Madagascar; 
the  partitioning  of  Africa  and  the  islands  of  the  Pacific  among  European  Powers; 
the  industrial  growth  of  Japan  and  her  entrance  into  the  family  of  nations  as  a  great 
naval  and  military  power;  tho  completion  of  the  great  military  highways  from  Hali- 
fax to  Vancouver  and  from  St.  Petersburg  to  Vladivostock;  the  rapid  peopling  of 
British  Columbia  and  our  North  Pacific  States  and  of  the  Amur  and  Manchuria  dis- 
tricts, all  tend  to  change  the  front  of  the  world  and  to  transfer  to  the  placid  Pacific 
the  national  activities  which  for  three  centuries  past  have  rendered  the  Atlantic  the 
theater  of  stirring  events. 

On  the  shores  of  such  an  ocean,  confronting  such  a  future,  there 
stands  the  vanguard  of  our  Pacific  States,  the  stately  advance  of  that 
Western  domain — imperial,  truly,  in  its  extent,  its  present  wealth,  and 
its  potentiality  of  riches  beyond  the  dreams  of  to-day — which  the 
Eepublic,  its  statesmen,  its  fleets  and  armies,  can  not  guard  too  well. 
With  unstinted  possibilities  of  progress  that  future  holds,  for  it  and  for 
the  nation,  the  dangers  of  contact  and  of  conflict  on  this  ocean  with 
powers,  old  or  new  in  the  world's  history,  whose  political  or  commercial 
interests  the  swift  changes  of  the  years  make  antagonistic  to  our  own. 

DEFENSES  OF  THE  PACIFIC  COAST. 

During  the  early  days  of  the  civil  war  the  isolated  and  unprotected 
condition  of  the  Pacific  States  aroused  fear  for  their  safety,  in  the  then 
possible  event  of  intervention,  in  that  conflict,  by  European  powers. 
For  a  generation  a  transcontinental  railway  had  been  under  intermit- 
tent d  iscussion,  and  the  possible  danger  of  attack  in  the  West  gave  the 
matter  definite  shape  in  the  passage,  in  1862,  of  an  act  which,  with  its 
later  amendments,  offered  Government  aid  of  a  most  generous  char- 
acter in  the  building  of  such  a  road. 

A  broad  right  of  way  was  given  through  the  national  domain,  with 
ample  grants  of  public  lands,  and  with  the  issuance  to  the  company  of 
Government  bonds  to  a  large  amount — reaching,  in  some  cases,  $48,000 
per  mile — in  exchange  for  second  mortgage  bonds  of  the  road.  Thus, 
through  the  vital  necessities  of  defense  in  the  stormy  years  of  war,  there 
was  born  the  movement  which  ended  in  the  building,  with  unstinted 
national  expenditure,  of  the  Union  Pacific  Railroad,  whose  last  spike 
was  driven  in  1869. 

The  facilities  now  offered  for  the  transportation  of  troops  would  seem 
to  render  improbable  the  successful  invasion  by  land  of  the  Pacific 
States.  Doctrines  formulated  in  the  early  days  of  the  Republic  still 
hold  in  keeping  the  army  of  the  United  States  low  in  numbers,  although 
not  in  efficiency.  Back  of  it,  there  stand,  however,  a  militia  of  112,000, 
with  a  force,  unorganized  but  available,  of  over  10,000,000  men,  capable 
of  bearing  arms.  The  three  coast  States  have  a  total  militia  of  about 
6,100,  and  California  alone  has,  in  addition,  205,000  men,  available  but 
unorganized.  From  continental  foes,  the  Pacific  group  would  seem, 
eventually,  to  be  secure,  although  the  absence  of  a  large  force  of  trained 
soldiery  might  be  felt  in  the  first  actions  of  a  sudden  wrr. 


Witli  the  shore  line  and  the  sea,  however,  different  conditions  are 
presented.  According  to  the  authorities  of  the  Coast  Survey,  the 
Atlantic  seaboard  is  '2,043  statute  miles  in  length,  the.  (iiilf  coast  l.^.vj 
miles,  and  the  "J'acific  coast  line,  i'rom  the  .Mexican  boundary  to  the 
Si  rait  of  Fuca,  including  the  straits  of  Race  Rock  Lights,  is  1,810  miles." 
Excluding  Alaska,  then,  the  rich  territory  on  the  Pacific  is  bounded 
by  one-third  of  our  total  shore  line;  and  upon  tins  coast,  exposed 
directly  to  bombardment  from  the  sea,  there  are  four  large  cities.  To 
a  very  recent  date,  at  least,  the  defenses  have  comprised  bat  obsolete 
works  at  San  Diego,  San  Francisco,  and  the  mouth  of  the  Columbia 
River. 

It  is  true  that  the  Board  of  Ordnance  and  Fortification  has  pre- 
sented estimates,  aggregating  nearly  $3,000,000,  for  guns,  emplace- 
ments, and  barracks  at  the  points  named,  with  Puget  Sound  in  addition ; 
but  this  material  forms  only  a  fraction  of  the  500  high-powered  guns, 
1,000  mortars,  300  rapid-fire  guns,  and  0,000  submarine  mines  now 
under  construction  for  the  protection  of  nearly  25  harbors  on  the 
three  coasts.  It  is  stated  that  not  more  than  one-half  of  the  total 
number  of  guns  will  be  in  place  by  the  summer  of  1898;  and,  with  the 
pressing  demands  of  the  Atlantic  and  the  Gulf,  it  is  to  be  presumed 
that  the  West  will  be  given  no  precedence. 

Again,  to  man  the  whole  of  these  seacoast  batteries,  the  present 
artillery  force  must  be  strengthened  by  the  enlistment  and  training — 
the  latter  a  work  of  time — of  not  less  than  7,500  men  as  a  skeleton 
organization  in  peace,  to  be  increased  to  probably  30,000  in  war.  It 
would  seem,  then,  that  the  defenses  of  even  the  four  main  points  of  the 
Pacific  coast  are  wholly  inadequate  and  are  likely  to  remain  so  for  a 
considerable  period,  while  in  the  end  the  many  vulnerable  positions 
remaining  on  that  extended  shore  line  beyond  the  tire  of  these  fortifi- 
cations will  be  indefensible  save  by  a  fleet. 

Long  ago,  for  England,  Sir  Walter  Raleigh  laid  down  her  true  policy 
of  defense,  a  policy  which  succeeding  generations  sometimes  remem- 
bered, sometimes  forgot,  as  the  years  passed,  but  which  she  has  reaf- 
firmed most  significantly  as  the  century  draws  to  a  close.  Not  for 
world-empire  nor  for  commerce  defense  only  has  she  -doubled  her  navy 
in  personnel  and  material  and  more  than  quadrupled  it  in  warlike  effi- 
ciency during  eleven  years  of  the  profoundest  peace  the  world  ever  saw." 
in  his  Historic  of  the  World,  Sir  Walter  says: 

But.  making  the  question  general,  the  positive,  "Whether  England,  without  the 
help  of  her  fleet,  be  able  to  debar  an  enemy  from  landing,''  I  hold  that  it  is  unable  to 
do  so,  and  therefore  1  think  it  most  dangerous  to  make  the  adventure. 

Again,  the  Duke  of  Wellington,  in  writing  Sir  John  Burgoyne  as  to 
the  English  coast  from  North  Foreland  to  Portsmouth,  said  that  — 

Excepting  immediately  under  the  fire  of  Dover  Castle,  there  is  not  a  spot  on  the 
coast  on  which  infantry  might  not  be  thrown  on  shore  at  any  time  of  tide,  with  any 
wind,  and  in  any  weather;  *  *  *  that,  in  that  space  of  coast,  there  are  not  loss 
than  seven  small  harbors,  or  mouths  of  rivers,  each  without  defense,  of  which  an 
enemy,  having  landed  his  infantry  on  the  coast,  might  take  possession,  and  therein 
land  ins  cavalry  and  artillery  of  all  caliber  and  establish  himself  and  his  communi- 
cations with  France. 

If  this  be  possible  in  England,  with  her  compact  territory  guarded 
by  stormy  seas,  and  despite  her  250,000  available  combatants  outside 
of  the  garrisons,  providing  only  that  the  command  of  the  sea  be  lost  for 
the  time,  it  may  safely  be  said  that,  with  a  fleet,  weak,  absent,  or 
defeated,  the  long  stretch  of  Pacific  shore  must  afford  not  a  few  vulner- 
able points,  far  from  the  great  centers,  susceptible  of  easy  seizure  by 


10 

hostile  ships,  and  capable  of  efficient  defense  by  their  forces  while  used 
as  a  base  for  naval  operations  on  the  coast.  Under  these  conditions 
enormous  damage  might  be  intiicted  by  one  or  two  powerful  squadrons 
unopposed  upon  the  sea. 

The  fleet  is,  then,  an  element  of  the  utmost  importance  to  the  defense 
of  what  Mahan  calls  "  our  weakest  frontier,  the  Pacific."  At  the  begin- 
ning of  the  present  year  the  United  States  had  on  the  western  coast 
9  vessels,  aggregating  35,141  tons  displacement,  and  across  the 
Pacific,  in  Asian  seas,  5  more  of  13,846  tons — a  total  force  of  14  modern 
vessels  of  40,987  tons.  Reenforcements  to  this  fleet  from  the  Atlantic 
coast  could  reach  California  only  in  about  ninety  days  or  more  from 
New  York,  allowing  for  necessary  stops  en  route,  and  after  steaming 
through  more  than  14,000  miles  in  waters  on  which  the  United  States 
has  not  one  station  for  supplying  and  refitting  vessels.  The  time,  the 
distance,  and  the  probable  difficulty  of  coaling  in  foreign  ports  after 
hostilities  shall  have  begun  practically  prohibit  relief  in  the  swift  com- 
iug  of  modern  war. 

Japan  has  at  this  time  a  fleet,  building  and  built — the  latter  almost 
wholly — of  48  vessels,  aggregating  173,057  tons,  excluding  torpedo 
craft.  Great  Britain,  at  the  close  of  last  year,  had  stationed  in  her 
Pacific,  Australian,  and  China  squadrons  a  total  of  41  vessels  of  97,200 
tons.  The  Siberian  fleet  of  Russia  at  that  time  comprised  13  cruisers 
and  6  torpedo  boats,  to  which  should  be  added  the  ships  from  the 
Cronstadt  station  doing  duty  in  Pacific  waters. 

It  will  be  seen  that,  with  this  great  and  defenseless  coast  to  watch, 
the  United  States  has  there  on  guard  a  modern  war  tonnage  equal  only 
to  about  one  hall  that  of  Great  Britain  in  this  ocean  and  to  about  28 
per  cent  that  of  Japan.  It  is  true  that  the  comparison  is  but  general; 
that  many  of  these  foreign  ships  are  small;  that  a  long  stretch  of  the 
Pacific  parts  many  from  our  shores,  and  that  other  conditions  would 
prevent  the  dispatch,  by  either  nation,  of  more  than  a  portion  as  attack- 
ing Meets. 

On  the  other  hand,  behind  Great  Britain's  squadron  lies  a  limitless 
reserve,  and  from  Esquimault,  if  she  could  hold  that  fortress,  or  from 
Hawaii,  if  she  could  take  the  islands,  she  could  throw  a  fully  equipped 
fleet  on  this  coast.  Of  Japan,  granting  her  Hawaii,  this  is  true  also; 
and  since  the  naval  strength  of  that  young  giantess  among  nations 
grows  faster  than  the  virile  locks  of  the  blind  Samson,  her  power — 
although  surely  not  her  will — for  attack,  increases  with  every  passing 
day. 

With  a  fleet  so  weak  that  it  can  neither  command  the  sea  nor  defend 
fitly  its  coast,  the  strides  which  steam  has  made  in  the  methods  of  sea 
communication  gives  a  gravity,  without  precedent  hitherto,  to  the 
danger  of  maritime  invasion.  Unobstructed  on  the  ocean,  Spain, 
although  poor  in  money  and  weak  in  military  power,  has  yet  been  able 
to  transport,  in  less  than  eighteen  months,  across  3,000  miles  of  sea, 
nearly  190,000  troops  to  Cuban  shores — a  feat  without  parallel  or 
approach  in  the  annals  of  modern  war. 

This  object  lesson,  still  in  full  view,  gives  for  the  future  added 
force  to  the  question  put  by  Murat  Halstead: 

What  will  happen  if  the  Asiatic  redundant  population,  instead  of  moving  west- 
ward and  finding  land  in  Europe,  as  they  did  thousands  of  years  ago,  should  turn 
eastward  and  contest  with  us  the  American  shores  of  the  Pacific  ? 

In  reviewing  the  defenses,  ashore  and  afloat,  of  the  Pacific  coast,  it 
would  seem  that  in  the  past  the  action  of  the  nation  has  been  gov- 
erned in  this — as  fbt  a  generation  in  many  military  matters — by  a 


11 

spirit  of  self-confidence,  of  easy  optimism,  which  would  he  warranted 
only  it'  "the  battle  llags  were  furled'  lor  all  time.  Ntival  and  military 
authorities  have  done  their  utmost  with  the  forces  at  their  command. 
"We,  the  people,"  alone  are  at  fault. 

"To  provide  for  the  common  defence"  was  one  of  the  purposes  for 
which  our  fathers  ordained  and  established  the  Constitution.  This 
purpose  seems  here  to  have  failed  of  full  execution  in  coast  defenses, 
in  the  fleet,  and  in  the  past  refusal  of  Hawa.i,  the  island  outpost  of 
this  shore. 

(  'aptain  Scriven,  U.  S.  A.,  writing  in  1894,  contrasts  national  con- 
fidence with  actual  conditions,  thus: 


\Ve  have  fought  the  great  war  of  modern  times.  We  have  had  millions  of 
under  arms  in  tlie  field.  Our  military  power  on  hind  is  without  limit;  therefore  we 
are  unconquerable  —  such  is  the  reasoning.  Hut  we  forget  that  the  United  States 
is.  liy  nature  and  hy  neglect,  one  of  the  most  vulnerable  nations  of  the  world,  and 
that  no  great  power  has  so  vast  an  extent  of  frontier  exposed  to  the  attack  of  an 
enemy. 

It  should  be  remembered,  too,  that  this  war  cost  half  a  million  lives, 
a  direct  outlay  of  2,(>7.~>  millions  of  dollars,  and  a  great  pension  list 
which  now,  more  than  thirty  years  after,  reaches  140  millions  —  a  debt 
which  the  nation  pays  in  thankfulness,  not  only  to  the  fading  ranks 
of  war-  worn  men,  n  ;w  maimed  and  old,  who  marched  to  the  music  of 
the  Republic's  battle  hymn  and  spent  their  blood  like  water  for  the 
flag,  but  to  the  kin  of  many  another  who,  on  sea  or  land,  gave  for 
that  flag  even  life  itself,  and  now  sleeps  in  peace  beneath  the  Southern 
pines  or  in  the  silent  depths  of  the  dark  sea. 

But  how  much  of  this  was  necessary?  What  blood  and  treasure 
were  spent  in  vain  —  through  lack  of  preparation,  of  war  material,  of  a 
trained  personnel  —  in  such  land  actions  as  the  first  Bull  Run,  or  such 
sea  tights  as  that  between  wooden  frigates  and  the  ironclad.  Merrimackf 

OUR  COMMERCE  ON  THE  PACIFIC. 

The  United  States  has  a  further  interest  than  defense  alone  in  the 
Pacific,  its  islands,  and  its  distant  shores.  We  have,  as  has  been 
shown,  a  territory  dependent  on  that  ocean  for  commercial  outlet  of 
800,000  square  miles,  larger  than  the  combined  area  of  the  German 
Empire,  France,  Italy,  Spain,  and  Portugal;  while  the  wide  expansion 
of  the  transcontinental  railroad  system  and  the  probable  completion, 
in  early  years,  of  the  Nicaraguan  Canal  give  other  States  as  well 
interests  of  grave  importance  in  Pacific  and  Asian  commerce. 

With  fertile  soil,  improved  methods  of  agriculture,  and  appliances  — 
as  a  whole,  without  equal  —  for  manufacturing,  the  United  States, 
despite  its  home  market,  whose  demand  stirs  the  envy  of  the  world, 
has  much  to  spare  for  other  lands.  The  exports  of  domestic  merchan- 
dise for  August,  1897,  were  valued  at  79£  millions  of  dollars.  During 
the  year  ending  June  30,  1800,  the  exports  include  of  domestic  mer- 
chandise, 8G3  millions;  of  breadstuff's,  141  millions;  of  provisions,  etc., 
131;  |  millions;  and  of  cotton,  unmanufactured,  190  millions. 

The  wealth  of  the  United  States  exceeds  that  of  the  Tnited  Kingdom 
by  20  billions  of  dollars,  and  it  increases  at  a  rate  hitherto  unknown  to 
history.  The  growth  in  manufacturing  may  be  judged  from  the  advance 
in  the  amount  of  manufactured  products  sent  abroad.  In  the  year 
ending  June  30,  1894,  these  products  formed  21.14  per  cent  of  the  total 
exports;  in  that  ending  June  30,  1896,  their  proportion  was  2(J.47  per 
cent,  and  they  aggregated  in  value  about  228£  millions  of  dollars. 


12 

Agriculture  gives  not  only  an  enormous  total  production,  but  that 
production  is  obtained,  through  improved  machinery,  by  a  minimum  of 
human  labor  so  low  as  almost  to  forbid  comparison  with  the  methods  of 
Europe.  There  is  yet,  also,  a  vast  acreage  untilled,  the  Pacific  States 
alone,  11  in  number,  having  but  6  per  cent  of  their  area  under  cultiva- 
tion. Mulhall  states  that  the  aggregate  energy,  in  foot-tons,  of  France, 
Germany,  and  Great  Britain  is  almost  exceeded  by  that  of  the  United 
States,  and  says  further,  as  to  agriculture,  that  the  labor  of  each  farm 
hand  throughout  the  Union  is  equivalent  to  a  production  of  14  tons  of 
grain,  and  in  the  Pacific  States  to  30  tons.  The  average  per  hand  is 
thus  fully  eight  times  that  of  Europe. 

The  extent  of  and  the  possibilities  for  America  in  the  markets  to  the 
westward  of  her  shores  are  indicated  by  the  Hon.  John  K.  Procter 
when  he  says: 

More  than  one-half  the  population  of  the  world  is  in  countries  fronting  the 
Pacific  and  Indian  oceans.  The  foreign  commerce  of  the  countries  bordering  these 
oceans,  excluding  North  America,  already  amounts  to  over  2±  billions  of  dollars  a 
year.  *  *  *  The  time  is  approaching  when  the  cotton  growers  of  the  South,  the 
wheat  growers  of  the  West,  the  meat  producers  of  our  plains,  and  manufacturers 
and  wage-earners  all  over  our  land  will  realize  that  exclusion  from  Asian  markets 
will  be  disastrous  to  their  best  interests. 

As  has  been  stated,  but  5.69  per  cent  of  the  total  import  and  export 
trade  of  the  United  States  passes  through  Pacific  ports,  which  in 
itself  gives  indication  of  our  feeble  interest  in  the  markets  of  Aus- 
tralasia and  the  Orient.  While  the  commerce  between  these  regions 
and  both  (toasts  of  the  United  States  is  considerable,  it  forms  but  a 
fraction  of  their  vast  foreign  trade. 

China  alone  imports  yearly  goods  valued  at  nearly  130  millions  of 
dollars;  the  imports  of  Japan  amount  to  138  million  yen;  those  of 
British  Australasia  to  51  million  pounds  sterling — and  so  this  world 
trade  mounts.  While  to  Asia,  during  the  year  ending  June  30,  1896, 
we  sent  but  25£  million  dollars' worth ;  to  Oceanica  but  17  millions' 
worth,  and  to  Africa  less  than  14  millions'  worth — the  total  exports  to 
these  countries  reaching  thus  but  56£  millions  of  dollars,  diminutive, 
indeed,  for  countries  whose  foreign  trade  is  2£  billions. 

There  seems  no  doubt  that  with  the  growing  production  of  the 
United  States  and  its  swelling  tide  of  exports  a  traffic,  steadily  aug- 
menting, will  How  from  her  western  shores  to  the  littoral  of  the  Orient, 
to  Australia,  and  to  the  Pacific  islands.  In  this  commerce  the  Atlantic 
seaboard  will  doubtless  share  largely  with  the  opening  of  the  water- 
way which  will  transform  the  Niearaguan  isthmus  into  an  ocean  cross- 
roads, where  the  East  and  the  West  shall  meet. 

OUB   SHIPPING  ON   THE   PACIFIC. 

Closely  allied  with  the  future  commercial  interests  of  the  United 
States  on  the  Pacific  should  be  the  revival  of  its  shipping,  an  industry 
whose  decadence  is,  at  once,  a  source  of  loss  and  of  reproach.  In  the 
steady,  if  not  swift,  growth  of  our  interests  in  the  markets  of  that 
ocean,  with  the  comparatively  sudden  leap  in  our  over-sea  trade  which 
the  Isthmian  canal  may  bring,  it  seems  impossible  that  there  shall  con- 
tinue the  deplorable  conditions  now  existing  in  transoceanic  service. 

The  Commissioner  of  Navigation,  in  his  report  for  1897,  gives  the 
registry  for  foreign  trade  as  less  than  800,000  gross  tons — the  lowest 
record  since  1841.  We  have  now  a  foreign  commerce  over  seven  times  as 
great  as  in  1846,  while  our  shipping  in  the  traffic  oversea  is  but  about 
eight  tenths  the  tonnage  thus  employed  in  that  year.  To  Great 
Britain,  mainly,  there  accrue  the  profits  froih  the  express  and  freight 
service  of  the  oceans. 


13 

/ 

Without  reference  to  that  which  might  be  gained  by  a  powerful 
American  marine  in  service  between  foreign  countries,  the  magnitude 
of  the  drain  upon  national  resources,  for  the  carriage  of  our  own  sales 
and  purchases,  should  impel  action  for  relief.  Of  this  enormous  loss 
Senator  Elkins  has  said:  "The  United  States  pays  $500,000  per  day, 
or  nearly  $3  per  capita  per  annum,  to  foreign  shipowners  for  carrying 
what  its  people  sell  and  buy,"  and  a  competent  authority  estimates 
further  the  amount  lost  annually  in  freight  and  passenger  tolls  and  in 
the  industrial  increment  represented  by  the  necessary  shipbuilding  as 
over  $300,000,000. 

Before  the  days  of  iron  hulls  and  before  the  Alabama  and  her  con- 
sorts had  left  ruin  in  their  wake,  the  United  States  showed  its  power 
to  compete  successfully  on  the  ocean  with  the  carriers  of  the  world. 
The  noble  vessels  of  the  new  naval  fleet,  the  steamers — superb,  if  but 
few — built  for  trans- Atlantic  traffic,  and  the  growth  of  shipbuilding  on 
the  Great  Lakes,  all  show  that  our  artisans  have  not  lost  their  former 
skill. 

On  the  lakes  especially,  the  expansion  of  commerce  has  been  swift 
and  large.  The  tonnage  which  goes  through  the  St.  Mary's  Canal  is 
nearly  twice  that  of  Suez;  although,  with  this,  it  should  be  remem- 
bered that  the  average  length  of  the  passages  made  by  steamers 
through  the  latter  is  sixty  days,  while  through  the  former  it  is  but 
six.  During  the  year  ending  June  30, 1897,  there  were  documented  for 
lake  service  1.4  million  tons  of  shipping,  an  increase  of  about  100  per 
cent  within  a" decade.  In  that  period,  also,  tho  cost  per  ton  (dead 
weight  ability)  of  large  steamers  has  fallen  more  than  50  per  cent  in 
the  lake  shipyards;  and  there  are  now  afloat  fully  a  score  of  vessels  of 
8,500  tons  displacement.  The  lake  tonnage  built  during  the  last  fiscal 
year  exceeded  that  of  all  other  sections  combined. 

The  triumphs  of  the  merchant  marine  of  the  old  days,  which  bore 
our  flag  on  every  sea,  and  the  great  and  growing  fleet,  constructed  and 
employed  at  home,  in  lake  and  coastwise  traffic,  show,  despite  our 
meager  tonnage  in  the  foreign  trade,  that  shipbuilding  and  ship  owning 
are  not  exotic  industries  in  the  United  States.  It  can  not  be,  then,  that 
the  nation  will  long  delay  in  taking  again  that  high  place  on  the  sea 
from  which,  for  a  generation,  it  has  turned  to  develop  the  lands,  the 
manufactures,  and  the  markets  of  half  a  continent.  The  coming  years 
should  see  not  only  a  vast  commerce  on  the  Pacific,  to  and  from  our 
shores,  but,  as  well,  a  merchant  marine,  flying  our  flag,  traversing  every 
highway  of  that  ocean — a  great  fleet  which  the  nation  by  wise  laws 
should  foster  and  strengthen,  and,  by  its  armed  forces  afloat,  should 
lead  and  guard. 

But  little  more  than  a  century  has  gone  by  since,  on  the  winter  wind 
at  Valley  Forge,  there  streamed  a  ragged  flag,  the  star  of  hope  to  the 
stern  soldiery,  whose  bare  and  bleeding  feet  reddened  the  snow,  as 
they  guarded  it  there.  In  the  generations  that  have  passed,  that 
flag — with  the  clustering  memories,  not  only  of  victory  by  land  and 
sea,  but  of  many  a  year  of  happy  peace — has  swept  from  ocean  to 
ocean. 

Shall  a  noble  destiny  lead  it  still  farther  on,  as — 

Bright  on  the  banner  of  lily  and  rose, 
I.o,  the  last  sun  of  our  century  sets? 

Shall  its  purpose  hold,  to  follow  the  pathway  of  the  stars,  "to  sail 
beyond  the  sunset,"  and — floating  over  Hawaii,  in  mid-Pacific — to 
guard  the  golden  shore  of  the  Kepublic,  and  to  win  a  new  glory  on  that 
wide  sea? 


14 


THE    STRATEGIC  VALUE    OP  HAWAII. 

"The  possibility  of  the  superior  naval  force  controlling  the  open 
Sea — either  for  facilitating  its  own  marches  across  it  for  descent  upon 
the  laud,  or  for  preventing  such  descents  by  the  inferior  naval  force — 
has  assuredly  grown  and  developed  into  probability  and  certainty  by 
every  improvement  in  the  capacity  of  the  ships  to  proceed  over  the  sea 
and  to  maintain  any  given  position  on  it" — thus  Vice- Admiral  Colomb, 
R.  X.,  a  strategic  authority,  writes  of  the  speed,  range  of  action,  and 
seaworthiness  of  modern  war  fleets. 

The  vast  shore  line  of  the  United  States,  the  magnitude  of  the  pres- 
ent and  potential  wealth  there  exposed,  the,  as  yet,  limited  coast 
defenses,  and  the  weakness,  relatively  to  those  of  the  great  maritime 
powers,  of  the  American  fleet,  all  combine  to  make  of  vital  moment  to 
the  Eepublic  the  march  of  improvement  in  warship  design,  which,  while 
these  conditions  prevail,  forms  an  ever-growing  menace  from  beyond 
the  seas. 

In  his  further  statement  that  "  command  of  the  sea  is  the  only  real 
defense  for  territory  which  can  be  captured  by  expeditions  over  it," 
Admiral  Colomb  but  affirms  the  teaching  of  Raleigh  and  of  many  a 
statesman  and  seaman  since  Sir  Walter's  day.  While  it  can  scarcely 
be  said  that  the  territory  of  the  United  States  is  susceptible  to  the 
extremity  of  permanent  "capture"  in  naval  war,  the  nation's  widely 
extended  boundaries  on  both  oceans  render  it,  of  all  great  powers,  the 
most  vulnerable  to  lesser  degrees  of  maritime  attack. 

On  the  Atlantic  and  Gulf  frontiers,  the  lo'ng  chain  of  foreign  naval 
bases,  from  Halifax  to  the  Caribbean  and  within  striking  distance  of 
the  coast,  will  make  that  sure  defense,  the  control  of  the  sea,  something 
to  be  bitterly  fought  for  when  war  shall  come.  The  Pacific,  as  yet,  is 
free  from  these  adverse  conditions.  The  geographical  distribution  of 
island  territory  there,  and  the  wholly  possible  acquirement  of  that  which 
is  essential,  would  seem  to  place  the  safeguard  of  sea  command  within 
the  reach  of  the  United  States,  to  be  grasped  now,  with  the  Hawaiian 
Islands,  or,  with  their  rejection,  to  be  had  again  only  by  war  and  conquest. 

OUR   PARAMOUNT   RIGHT   IN   THE  NORTH  PACIFIC. 

The  Pacific  Ocean  is  an  expanse  of  magnificent  distances.  Over  the 
lands  of  no  empire,  the  ''barren  foam"  of  DO  sea,  can  oue  traverse  so 
many  leagues  without  crossing  the  border,  as  upon  its  waters.  Its  area 
is  two-fifths  that  of  the  whole  surface  of  the  globe  and  more  than  two 
and  one-third  times  that  of  the  Atlantic,  with  all  its  tributary  seas.  In 
the  distribution  of  the  land  within  its  limits,  the  Pacific  presents 
marked  contrasts.  Its  southwestern  area  is  a  vast  and  tangled  cluster 
of  islets,  islands,  and  archipelagoes,  culminating  in  continental  Aus- 
tralia; its  eastern  and  northern  portions  are  but  an  ocean  desert,  where 
"gloom  the  dark,  broad  seas"  alone,  save  for  such  far  oases  as  Hawaii. 

Conquest,  treaty,  and  an  imperial  purchase  have  given  the  United 
States  a  position,  clearly  paramount,  on  the  northern  Pacific.  The 
boundaries  of  the  Republic  reach  so  far  across  these  waters  that — 
between  eastern  Maine  at  one  extremity  to  the  farthest  of  the  Aleutians 
at  the  other — the  geographic  center  of  its  territory  lies  westward  of  the 
Golden  Gate.  The  Pacific  States  have  a  seaboard  equal  to  that  of  the 
Gulf,  and  but  one-tenth  less  than  that  of  the  Atlantic;  while  Alaska 
and  the  islands  have  a  coast  line  more  than  eight-tenths  that  of  all 
these  three  combined. 


15 

From  the  southern  limit  of  California  at  32°  28'  north,  this  ocean  is, 
on  its  eastern  and  northern  sides,  bounded  by  American  territory,  con- 
tinental or  islaudic,  unbroken  save  by  the  short  link  of  British  Colum- 
bian coast,  and  reaching  through  nearly  three-fourths  the  longitude 
from  California  to  Japan. 

It  would  seem,  then,  that  the  North  Pacific  is,  in  effect,  an  American 
Ocean,  and  that  the  United  States  should  hold,  in  nature's  fee  simple, 
the  title  to  a  sphere  of  influence  there,  to  a  paramount  control.  This 
right  is  not  tangible  in  law,  nor  recogni/able  by  treaty,  but  it  is  yet 
inherent  through  the  possession  of  an  imperial  territory  which  bounds, 
almost  wholly,  these  northern  waters,  which  looks  to  them  for  commer- 
cial outlet,  and  which,  from  them,  is  susceptible  to  attack  in  war. 

THE    STRATEGIC   POSITION   OF   HAWAII. 

If  this  long  stretch  of  coast  and  archipelago  be  taken  as  a  vast. 
although  irregular,' curve,  struck  when  the  world  was  new,  we  see  the 
volcanic  peaks  which  form  the  Hawaiian  group,  rising,  out  in  the  open 
ocean,  at  the  center  of  this  primeval  circle.  They  stand  directly  south 
of  Alaska's  greater  area  and  southwest  of  Caliloruia,  confronting  and 
commanding  both  and  all  the  intervening  shore.  Between  them  and 
these  lands  there  lie  no  further  islands  to  bridge  a  passage  or  give 
shelter  or  support  to  friend  or  foe.  Alone,  with  neither  peer  nor  rival, 
they  watch,  as  nature's  fortress  of  these  seas. 

There  are  twelve  principal  islands  in  the  group,  eight  of  which  are 
inhabited.  They  lie  between  the  parallels  of  18°  50'  and  1*3°  5'  north, 
and  the  meridians  of  154°  40'  and  101°  50'  west  from  Greenwich. 
Measuring  roughly  in  longitude,  they  are  distant  from  California  about 
two  fifths  the  space  between  it  and  Japan  and  about  one-third  that 
between  it  and  Hongkong.  They  lie  nearly  midway  between  Hong- 
kong and  Panama. 

Jomini,  a  very  high  authority  on  the  art  of  war,  defines  a  position 
which  is  "a  center  of  communication"  as  a  geographical  strategic 
point,  adding  that  if  through  its  possession  control  is  given  "  Of  the 
center  of  the  chief  lines  of  communication"  of  the  area  to  be  fought 
for  the  position  is  "decisive."  It  would  appear  that  with  regard  to 
the  North  Pacific  and  its  boundaries  this  group  fulfills  signally  these 
conditions. 

There  are  now  seven  steamship  lines  crossing  the  Pacific  from  United 
States  and  British  Columbian  ports  to  China,  Japan,  and  Australia, 
and  to  six  of  these  Honolulu  is  a  port  of  call.  It  is  directly  on  the 
shortest  line  between  British  Columbia  and  Sydney,  Australia,  and  on 
that  between  the  Isthmus  of  Nicaragua  and  Shanghai,  China,  and  is 
very  near  to  those  connecting  British  Columbia  and  Auckland,  New 
Zealand,  the  Isthmus  and  Yokohama,  and  the  Isthmus  and  Hongkong. 

While  Honolulu  does  not  lie  in  the  direct  route  from  San  Frain -isro 
to  Yokohama,  it  is  but  9;10  miles  from  it,  thus  Hanking  it  at  a  distance 
which  a  swift  cruiser  of  the  Columbia  class  will  traverse  i  u  less  than  forty - 
eight  hours.  As  a  whole,  it  may  be  said  of  Hawaii  that  it  controls 
fully  these  vital  lines  of  communication  and  answers  in  marked  degree 
the  requisites  prescribed  by  Jomini  for  a  decisive  stragetic  point,  one, 
indeed,  of  far-reaching  dominion  as  "the  gateway  and  tollgate  of  the 
water  roads  to  China,  Japan,  the  Indies,  the  Orient,"  from  North 
America  and  from  the  Isthmus,  with,  as  well,  the  highway  from  Canada 
to  Australasia. 

It  may  be  urged,  however,  that  the  ocean  is  but  a  trackless  waste; 


16 

that,  on  its  surface,  lines  of  travel  are  unstinted  in  their  course; 
that,  with  war,  these  great  water  routes  would  change.  This  in  but 
a  limited  sense  is  true.  Conditions  of  winds,  of  distances,  of  supplies, 
of  trade,  make  laws,  elastic  in  but  small  degree,  which  fix  certain 
lines  of  passage  on  the  sea,  as  on  the  land  the  centers  of  population 
and  the  conformation  of  the  surface  determine  the  great  arteries  of 
travel  and  traffic. 

Peculiarly  is  this  true  of  Hawaii's  relation  to  the  navigation  of  much 
of  the  Pacific  area.  The  Hon.  Lorin  A.  Thurston  shows  very  clearly 
the  commanding  position  of  these  islands  when  he  says: 

In  the  whole  Pacific  Ocean,  from  the  equator  on  the  south  to  Alaska  on  the  north, 
from  the  coast  of  China  and  Japan  on  the  west  to  the  American  continent  on  the 
east,  there  is  but  one  spot  where  a  ton  of  coal,  a  pound  of  bread,  or  a  gallon  of 
water  can  be  obtained  by  a  passing  vessel,  and  that  spot  is  Hawaii , 

The  immensity  of  this  area  of  the  earth's  surface  is  comprehended  by  but  few. 
The  distance  from  Hongkong  through  Hawaii  to  Panama  is  9,580  miles.  This  dis- 
tance is  as  far  as  from  San  Francisco  eastward  across  the  continent,  across  the 
Atlantic,  across  the  Mediterranean,  and  across  Turkey  to  the  boundary  of  Persia. 
The  first  supply  station  north  of  Hawaii  is  at  Unalaska,  in  the  Aleutian  Islands,  and 
the  first  similar  station  on  the  south  is  Tahiti,  a  French  colony.  The  distance 
between  Unalaska  and  Tahiti  is  4,400  miles;  as  far  as  from  the  southern  point  of 
Greenland  to  the  mouth  of  the  Amazon  River. 

Honolulu  would  appear  then  to  be,  for  these  ocean  highways,  not  a 
convenience  merely,  to  be  disregarded  at  will;  Taut  for  the  greater  part 
of  them  a  necessary  port  in  peace,  and  for  all  a  lion  in  the  path  if  held 
in  war  by  hostile  hands. 

Again,  its  distances  to  important  harbors  of  the  Pacific  give  proof 
of  Hawaii's  commanding  position  as  a  commercial  and  military  center 
of  prime  importance.  Its  isolation  on  the  north  and  east  has  been 
referred  to;  although  scattered  groups  approach  it  on  the  west  and 
south,  it  seems  tnere  also  to  be  equally  free  from  any  which  might  rank 
as  worth  y  rivals. 

From  San  Francisco  it  is  parted  by  2,080  miles  of  sea,  but  little  more 
than  four  days'  steaming;  and  this  distance  forms,  approximately,  the 
radius  of  a  great  circle,  within  which  it  has  no  peer.  On  the  cicumfer- 
euce  thus  described,  and  at  distances  from  Honolulu  ranging  between 
2,000  and  2,400  miles,  there  are  situated  San  Diego,  San  Francisco, 
Portland,  Sitka,  and  (Jnalaska,  harbors  of  the  United  States;  Samoa, 
over  which  she  has  partial  control;  Esquimault,  the  fortified  port  of 
British  Columbia;  the  Marshall  Islands,  annexed  by  Germany;  the 
Gilbert  group,  lately  acquired  by  Great  Britain ;  and  the  French  station 
of  Tahiti.  Just  beyond  the  area,  2,700  miles  from  Honolulu,  there 
appears  Fiji,  the  nearest  station  of  importance  in  British  Australasia. 
From  circumference  to  center  of  this  vast  circular  expanse  the  sea  is 
bare,  except  of  lonely,  infrequent  islets  of  no  value.  Hawaii's  sway 
there,  her  power  to  reach  the  fringing  continent  or  island  groups,  with 
equal  ease,  for  good  or  ill,  is  indisputable. 

As  to  the  large  ports  of  Australasia  and  the  Orient,  at  which  in  war 
a  hostile  fleet  could  rendezvous,  and  to  a  greater  or  less  extent  refit, 
it  would  appear  from  the  following  table  that  the  distances  between 
them  and  Honolulu  exceed  greatly,  in  most  cases,  the  breadth  of  the 
Atlantic;  and  that  from  such  possibly  hostile  pointsof  military  strength 
Hawaii  is,  if  we  except  those  of  the  American  Continent,  safer  than 
New  York : 


Miles. 


Yokohama,  Japan 3, 400 

Nagasaki,  Japan 4, 000 

Vladivostok,  Siberia 3,  670 

Auckland,  New  Zealand 3, 850 


Miles. 


Sydney,  Australia 4, 500 

Hongkong,  China 4, 900 

Shanghai,  China 5, 000 

Manila 5,000 


17 

Just  here  there  may  be  noted  the  peculiar  and  extraordinary  value 
of  Hawaii  to  the  defense  of  our  Western  coast.  As  has  been  shown, 
Honolulu  is  within  easy  distance  of  French,  German,  English,  and 
Japanese  stations  on  the  Pacific;  it  lies,  as  well,  but  2,100  miles  from 
the  United  States  shore.  If  either  of  these  foreign  nations  held  the 
islands  its  ships  reaching  Hawaii  could  take  on  supplies,  and  in  five  or 
six  days  thereafter  could  appear  oft'  California  with  ample  fuel  remain- 
ing for  offensive  operations  or  for  retreat,  if  necessary,  to  their  island 
base. 

If,  however,  Hawaii  be  omitted  from  the  problem,  the  situation 
changes  wholly.  Excluding  those  on  the  American  continent,  the 
foreign  station  nearest  to  our  Pacific  seaboard  is  that  of  the  French  at 
Tahiti,  distance  3,000  miles;  but  this  port  is  so  far  from  home  and  sup- 
ports as  to  prohibit  its  use,  effectively,  as  a  naval  base  for  attack  on 
this  coast.  There  is  no  other  over-sea  statioji  so  near  as  is  Tahiti,  those 
of  Japan,  China,  Great  Britain,  Russia,  and  Spain  being  from  4,500  to 
5,500  miles  away. 

Now,  for  a  descent  upon  our  western  territory  a  hostile  fleet  must 
comprise  battle  ships  and  cruisers  of  the  first  rank.  Taking  British 
vessels  as  typical  of  the  best  foreign  ships  for  over-sea  work,  we  find 
that  the  Royal  Sovereign  battle  ship,  14,150  tons,  and  the  Diadem,  first- 
class  cruiser,  11,000  tons,  have  each  a  coal  endurance  of  but  5,000  miles 
at  a  speed  of  10  knots. 

In  other  words,  of  the  ships  starting  from  these  distant  stations — 
without  access,  en  route,  to  Hawaii — steaming  at  most  moderate  speed, 
and  unopposed  upon  the  sea,  only  those  from  the  nearest  ports  could 
reach  California  waters,  and  these  only  with  fuel  for  about  500  miles 
more  at  10  knots,  with  limited  capacity  for  attack,  none  whatever  for 
retreat,  and  with  the  surety  of  meeting  a  fully  equipped  fleet  of  the 
United  States. 

The  use  of  steam  colliers  to  supply  a  fleet  at  sea  would  be  a  most 
effective  aid  in  war;  but  so  far  this  seems  not  fully  practicable.  It  is 
true  that,  during  the  maneuvers  of  1893,  a  British  squadron  was  par- 
tially coaled  in  rough  waters  at  Torboy  from  supply  vessels  fitted  with 
the  Tern perley  transporter,  and  that,  two  years  later,  the  French  armor- 
clad  Richelieu  also  coaled  partially  at  sea;  but  no  trial  on  an  extended 
scale  has  yet  been  made  of  these  appliances,  and  they  have  not  won 
full  confidence.  Even  granting  their  efficiency  in  the  transfer  from 
collier  to  ironclad,  such  supply  vessels  must  run  the  gauntlet  of  hostile 
cruisers;  reaching  the  sea  rendezvous  at  the  time  set  will  be  uncertain; 
and,  furthermore,  the  bunker  arrangements  of  warships  will  make 
impossible  the  stowing,  in  a  seaway,  of  a  full  supply,  even  if  it  were 
placed  upon  their  decks. 

Under  these  conditions — as  to  distance,  fuel,  and  Hawaii — hostile 
operations  from  these  stations  on  this  coast,  at  this  stage  in  marine 
propulsion,  would  be  midsummer  madness.  If,  then,  there  were  no 
Hawaii — if  it  could  be  blotted  wholly  from  the  map — the  Pacific  coast 
would  be  at  this  time  entirely  safe  from  transoceanic  attack.  Since 
these  islands  are,  however,  a  permanent  feature  of  the  sea  scape,  this 
security  can  be  had  only  by  their  transfer  to  the  United  States  and 
such  guarding  thereafter  as  will  prevent  their  use,  in  war,  by  any  foe. 

With  regard  to  the  foreign  station  at  Esquimault,  British  Columbia, 
it  need  only  be  said  that  it  is  as  remote  from  trans-Pacific  attack  or 
reinforcement  as  is  our  western  shore  from  foes  beyond  the  sea.  Hono- 
lulu, as  a  port  of  call,  is  necessary  to  complete  its  naval  communi- 
cations. If,  however,  Hawaii  shall  become  American  territory,  the 

iLEL 2 


18 

conditions  previously  recited,  as  to  fuel  and  distance,  will  prevent  the 
naval  support  from  Australia  or  Hongkong  of  this  port  in  the  seem- 
ingly most  improbable  event  of  war  between  England  and  the  United 
States.  Its  resources,  for  attack  or  for  defense,  would  then  come  only 
from  the  continent  and  from  such  warships  as  might  lie  under  its  guns. 

From  another  view  point  Hawaii  is  worthy  of  consideration.  For 
all  purposes  of  war  the  British  practically  hold  the  Suez  Canal,  the 
vital  link  in  the  pathway  to  their  imperial  dominions  in  the  East. 
Indeed,  in  crushing  Arabi-Bey  they  seized  this  waterway  and  closed  it 
to  commerce  for  a  time,  asserting  thus  a  right  inherent  through  the 
possession  of  a  vast  domain  to  which  the  canal  forms  the  immediate 
approach  in  war. 

Of  perhaps  greater  importance,  strategically,  to  the  United  States 
will  be  that  other  isthmian  passage,  whose  cutting  seems  now  a  work 
of  the  near  future.  A  President  and  a  soldier,  Eutherford  B.  Hayes, 
has  said: 

Au  interoceanic  canal  across  the  American  isthmus  will  essentially  change  the 
geographical  relations  between  the  Atlantic  and  Pacific  coasts  of  the  United  States, 
and  between  the  United  States  and  the  rest  of  the  world.  '  Our  merely 

commercial  interest  in  it  is  greater  than  that  of  all  other  countries;  while  its  rela- 
tion to  our  power  and  prosperity  as  a  nation,  to  our  means  of  defense,  our  unity, 
peace,  and  safety,  are  matters  of  paramount  concern  to  the  people  of  the  United 
States. 

In  his  monograph,  "  The  Nicaraguan  Canal  in  its  Military  Aspect," 
Captain  Scriveu,  U.  S.  A.,  says: 

We  may  obtain  the  preponderance  on  either  seaboard  if  we  have  but  a  short  cut 
across  the  Isthmus.  The  strategic  value  of  the  canal  in  the  defense  of  our  coasts 
thus  becomes  evident  at  once.  The  actual  saving  of  distance  between  New  York  and 
San  Francisco  will  be  about- 9,894  miles.  From  New  York  to  .San  Francisco  via  the 
Nicaragua  Canal  the  distance  is  4,960  miles ;  New  Orleans  to  San  Francisco  by  canal, 
4,017  miles.  Thus  by  means  of  it  our  fleets  could  be  transferred  from  the  Pacific 
ports  to  those  of  the  Atlantic  with  10,000  miles  less  steaming  than  is  now  the  case, 
and  the  smaller  navy  concentrated  at  a  point  threatened  Ity  foreign  attack  probably 
belore  the  blow  could  be  delivered — an  impossibility  with  10,000  miles  of  sea  travel 
along  coasts  where  coal  could  perhaps  not  be  obtained  in  war,  added  to  the  5,000 
miles  of  steaming  between  New  York  and  San  Francisco  necessary  even  if  a  canal 
were  constructed. 

In  short,  a  canal  under  United  States  control  will  give  all  the  advantage  to  the 
defense  that  is  to  be  derived  from  maneuvering  on  inside  lines,  and  will,  in  addi- 
tion, give  the  probability  of  naval  stations  and  the  certainty  of  coaling  stations  on 
the  road  of  ships  from  the  Pacific  to  the  Atlantic  seaboard.  *  *  *  With  a  power 
to  throw  a  preponderating  force  on  either  seaboard,  it  is  evident  that  the  United 
States  may  not  only  defend  her  own  coasts  effectively,  but  may  be  enabled  to  so 
concentrate  her  naval  strength  as  to  threaten  any  point  north  or  south  on  the  coast 
of  either  ocean  or  in  the  AVest  Indies  without  weakening  too  greatly  her  own  coast 
protection,  and  thus  divert  a  large  force  of  hostile  ships  by  the  necessity  of  defend- 
ing such  stations  as  Halifax,  Esquimault,  Bermuda,  Havana,  or  Jamaica,  and  of 
guarding  merchant  shipping  in  western  waters. 

In  the  Mediterranean,  midway  between  Port  Said  and  Gibraltar, 
there  stands  Malta,  won  in  1798  from  the  Knights  of  St.  John  through 
the  treachery  of  Bonaparte,  captured  two  years  later  by  the  British, 
and  confirmed  to  them  by  the  Congress  of  Vienna.  In  its  massive  for- 
tifications and  its  central  position  on  the  line  of  communication  from 
Egypt  to  Gibraltar  this  mid-Mediterraneam  outpost  is  vital  to  British 
control  of  isthmian  transit. 

As  with  Malta  and  Suez,  so  with  Honolulu  and  Nicaragua.  Hawaii 
is,  with  regard  to  the  Orient,  the  mid- Pacific  outpost  of  the  American 
canal,  standing  halfway  between  the  Isthmus  and  the  East,  on  or 
near  every  line  of  travel  between  these  points,  and  with  no  island  of 
military  importance  even  approaching  its  communications  with  the 


19 

future  crossroads  of  the  Western  world.  In  view  of  these  considera- 
tions,  there  may  well  be  questioned  the  wisdom  of  investing  millions 
of  American  money,  national  or  private,  in  this  waterway,  if  the  Kepub- 
lic  shall  not  hold,  as  well,  its  central  Pacific  outpost. 

It  will  not  serve  to  say  that  we  shall  have  a  sea  station  on  the  Gala- 
pagos Islands.  Theirs  is  a  flanking  position  only  as  to  the  Oriental 
highway;  they  are  neither  central  nor  on  lines  of  communication;  they 
are,  relatively,  near  the  coast  and  under  its  influence;  and  Hawaii  and 
the  canal  will  bear  to  them  largely  the  relation  held  by  Malta  and  Suez 
to  Cyprus — that  somewhat  overrated  prize  which  Disraeli,  in  theatri- 
cal pomp,  brought  as  a  token  of  "peace  with  honor"  from  Berlin. 

Neither  will  it  avail  to  urge  that  Hawaii's  distance  to  the  Isthmus, 
4,-00  miles,  will  be  prohibitory  of  military  operations  from  it  against 
the  canal.  That  is  practically  true  now;  but  a  wise  people  builds  for 
the  future,  for  its  sons  of  the  coming  years,  and  the  swift  advance  that 
lialf  a  century  has  seen  in  the  speed  of  communication  over  sea  makes 
it  temerity  indeed  to  say  what,  in  thti  annihilation  of  ocean  distance, 
the  years  have  in  store. 

In  the  utilization  of  the  mobile  defenses  of  the  United  States,  there 
is  no  element  which  approaches  in  importance  the  isthmian  waterway. 
Without  it,  the  fleet  of  one  coast  is  unavailable  for  the  other;  with  it 
every  naval  gun  may  be  turned  upon  the  foe,  whether  he  shall  come 
from  east  or  west.  If,  however,  we  shall  desire  to  control  fully  the 
coming  canal,  the  possession  of  Hawaii  would  seem  to  be,  militarily,  an 
essential. 

In  reviewing  what  has  been  said  herein  as  to  the  strategic  position 
of  Hawaii,  there  may  be  noted  that  it  is  the  central  and  only  important 
occupant  of  a  vast  circle  of  sea,  on  whose  circumference  lie  the  Western 
and  A  laskan  ports  of  the  United  States  and  the  nearest  foreign  stations, 
and  that  it  has,  therefore,  access,  equally  easy  to  all,  for  good  or  ill; 
that  it  is  so  far  distant  from  the  larger  trans-Pacific  ports  of  military 
strength  as  to  make  it  safer,  in  this  respect,  than  is  New  York;  that, 
through  its  nearness,  relatively,  to  the  United  States,  it  is  the  only  sea 
base  from  which  our  Western  coast  can  be  attacked;  that  from  the 
equator  to  Alaska,  and  from  China  and  Japan  to  the  American  shore, 
it  is  the  only  port  of  supply;  that  it  dominates  the  principal  lines  of 
communication  on  the  Pacific,  being  on,  near,  or  strongly  flanking  those 
from  Canada  and  our  Western  coast  to  British  Australasia  and  the  East, 
and  from  the  Isthmus  to  the  Orient;  that  it  is  now  a  port  of  call  for  six 
of  the  seven  trans- Pacific  steamship  lines;  and,  finally,  that  it  is  a  mid- 
oceanic  outpost  of  the  proposed  Nicaraguau  Canal,  as  important,  in 
degree,  with  regard  to  the  far  East  as  Malta  is  to  Suez.  It  may  safely 
be  said  that  on  our  globe  there  are  no  islands  whose  strategic  position, 
with  regard  to  the  area  commanded,  equals  that  of  Hawaii. 

HAWAII'S   MILITARY   STRENGTH. 

Position  alone  will  not,  however,  constitute  an  ocean  fortress. 
Reduced  to  its  elements,  mere  position  might  be  represented,  in  a  shal- 
low sea,  by  an  anchored  buoy.  There  must  be  as  well  the  capacity  for 
defense,  either  existing  naturally  or  supplied,  since  war  is  not  fought 
with  strategic  points  or  with  even  fortresses,  but  by  their  aid  in  the 
support — the  supply  and,  if  need  be,  shelter— of  the  "far-flung  battle 
line."  On  the  sea  that  battle  line  is  naval,  and  the  strength  of  the 
ocean  fortress  is  measured  largely,  although  not  wholly,  by  its  power  to 
guard  a  fleet  against  a  fleet. 

As  has  been  noted,  the  Hawaiian  Islands  form  an  archipelago  which 


20 

extends  east  and  west  1,200  miles,  the  eight  inhabited  islands  covering 
300  miles  at  the  eastern  extremity.  Of  these  islands,  one,  Oahu,  far 
exceeds  in  importance  the  rest,  since  on  its  coast  there  are  situated 
Honolulu,  the  only  good  commercial  port,  and  Pearl  Harbor,  the  only 
place  capable  of  sheltering  a  fleet  in  the  entire  group.  To  Oahu,  then, 
the  inquiry  as  to  the  military  strength  of  the  islands  must  necessarily 
be  restricted. 

Varying  opinions  have  been  expressed  as  to  the  practicability  of 
fortifying  Honolulu  fully  against  attack  by  sea.  There  seems  to  be  the 
possibility  of  a  strong  defense  through  heavy  batteries  mounted  on  the 
hills  in  the  rear,  and  perhaps  on  the  reef  a  mile  in  front  of  vessel 
moorings.  Guns  so  placed  would  command  a  sweep  of  sea  of  at  least 
90°,  embracing  the  approaches  to  the  port.  The  practicability  of 
wholly  effective  emplacements,  especially  with  regard  to  the  reef 
batteries,  has,  however,  been  questioned.  In  1872  Generals  Schofield 
and  Alexander,  U.  S.  A.,  reported  to  the  Secretary  of  War  with  regard 
to  the  conditions  then  that  "an  enemy  could  take  up  his  position  out- 
side of  the  entrance  to  the  harbor  and  command  the  entire  anchorage, 
as  well  as  the  town  of  Honolulu  itself." 

Pearl  Harbor  lies  7  miles  to  the  westward  of  Honolulu.  It  is  an 
oblong  bay  or  estuary,  6  miles  long  and  3  wide,  with  its  longer  axis 
parallel  to  the  coast;  entered  from  the  sea  through  a  narrow  strait, 
which  is  nearly  3  miles  long,  of  varying  width  and  about  three  eighths 
of  a  mile  in  breadth  at  the  narrowest  point.  The  sea  line  of  the  harbor 
is  the  encircling  coral  reef  of  the  island,  through  which,  however,  oppo- 
site the  passage,  there  is  a  break,  blocked  for  the  present  by  a  bar  of 
coral  sand. 

Two  peninsulas,  extending  seaward  from  the  back  of  the  harbor,  and 
an  island  within  it,  divide  the  bay  into  three  parts.  Both  island  and 
peninsulas  command  the  strait,  partially  or  wholly,  one  of  the  penin- 
sulas reaching  across  the  bay  and  into  its  inner  mouth.  Inside  the 
bar  the  passage  is  from  7  to  10  fathoms  deep ;  within  the  harbor  the 
depth  varies  from  5  to  7  fathoms.  There  are  30  miles  of  water  front, 
remarkable  in  this,  that  its  walls  approach  the  perpendicular.  "In 
other  words,  the  largest  of  vessels  could  almost  be  moored  broad- 
side against  this  beach  (of  Puuloa).  Deep  water,  close  to  the  shore,  • 
is  a  characteristic  of  the  greater  portion  of  Pearl  Harbor,"  says  Lieut. 
W.  M.  Wood,  U.  S.  N.,  who  made  extensive  surveys  there. 

Of  further  features  of  the  bay  and  its  environment,  a  Senator,  a 
recent  visitor  to  the  islands,  says : 

Two  hundred  sail  could  easily  be  moored  to  the  shores,  in  positions  of  perfect 
safety.  Deep  water  is  found  all  along  the  shores  of  the  bay,  all  of  which  are  .per- 
pendicular walls  of  stone.  They  could  scarcely  be  more  regular  and  useful  if  they 
had  been  built  by  skilled  workmen. 

On  the  side  of  the  bay,  next  to  Honolulu,  hills  from  the  seacoast  are  from  100  to 
500  feet  high.  Guns  on  these  elevations  would  easily  command  the  entrance  to  both 
harbors,  while  within  Pearl  Harbor  and  back  of  Honolulu  the  points  available  for 
harbor  defense  could  scarcely  be  more  advantageous.  *  A  vessel  can  be 

moored  at  almost  any  place  along  miles  of  shore  line  and  will  be  out  of  sight  from 
sea,  except  the  toprigging.  The  largest  ship  can  easily  turn  in  the  narrowest  part; 
while  a  dry  dock  can  be  constructed  at  a  low  cost  at  many  places  in  Pearl  Harbor, 
with  walls  excavated  in  the  rock. 

With  regard  to  a  channel  through  the  bar,  Kear  Admiral  John  G. 
Walker,  U.  S.  N.,  has  reported : 

The  examination  shows  conclusively  that  there  is  a  channel  through  the  reef  at 
Pearl  Harbor,  filled  with  loose  coral  sand ;  and  that  a  suction  dredge  can  rapidly  and 
cheaply  open  a  way  for  the  largest  ships.  *  *  The  channel  is  practically 
Hraight  and  the  distance  between  the  walls  of  live  coral  is  at  no  point  less  than  300 
feet. 


21 

Lieut.  W.  M.  Wood,  who,  in  1804,  surveyed  this  proposed  channel, 
estimates  the  cost  of  a  cut  250  feet  wide,  with  a  depth  of  30  feet  at 
mean  low  water  and  of  widening  and  deepening  the  channel  inside,  at 
$105,000. 

Generals  Schofield  and  Alexander,  in  the  report  referred  to  pre- 
viously, stated  that — 

With  one  exception,  there  is  no  harbor  on  the  islands  that  can  be  made  to  satisfy 
all  of  the  conditions  necessary  for  a  harbor  of  refuge  in  time  of  war.  This  is  the 
harbor  of  Ewa,  or  Pearl  Kiver.  *  *  *  It  could  be  completely  defended  by  inex- 
pensive batteries  on  either  or  both  shores,  firing  across  a  narrow  channel  or  entrance. 
Its  waters  are  deep  enough  for  the  largest  vessels  of  war,  and  its  lochs,  particularly 
around  Kabbit  Island,  are  spacious  enough  for  a  largo  number  of  vessels  to  ride  at 
anchor  in  perfect  security  against  all  storms.  Its  shores  are  suitable  for  building 
proper  establishments  for  sheltering  the  necessary  supplies  for  a  naval  establishment, 
such  as  magazines  of  ammunition,  provisions,  coal,  spars,  rigging,  etc.,  while  the 
Island  of  Oahu,  upon  which  it  is  situated,  could  furnish  fresh  provisions,  meats, 
'fruits,  and  vegetables  in  large  quantities. 

Such,  then,  is  Pearl  Harbor,  to  which,  on  November  9,  1887,  the 
King  of  the  Hawaiian  Islands  granted  the  United  States  the  exclusive 
right  of  entrance,  of  maintaining  there  "a  coaling  and  repair  station 
for  the  use  of  vessels  of  the  United  States,"  and  of  improving  the 
entrance  to  its  anchorage.  In  reviewing  the  characteristics  of  this 
noble  bay,  which  fit  it  for  a  naval  station  without  superior  on  any  sea, 
there  may  be  noted : 

Its  extent:  G  miles  long  and  3  broad,  both  in  the  extreme;  with  30 
miles  of  water  front,  and  large  enough  to  hold  with  ease  the  entire 
navy  of  Great  Britain.  Its  depth  of  tenter :  20  fathoms  in  some  parts, 
but  generally  5  to  7,  sufficient  for  the  heaviest  modern  ships.  Its  per- 
pendicnlar  /rails:  Enabling  ships  to  be  moored  almost  along  the  shore. 
Its  sheltered  position :  Shielded  by  hills  100  to  500  feet  high,  ships  may 
ride  in  security  from  any  storm;  they  may  be,  but  for  their  mastheads, 
invisible  from  sea,  and  if  moored  to  the  inner  shore  will  be  8  miles  at 
least  from  the  reef  and  from  any  foe.  Its  capacity  for  defense:  Against 
hind  attack,  by  batteries  on  the  neighboring  hills;  against  that  from 
sea,  by  an  entrance  protected  with  ease — a  contracted  strait,  3  miles 
long,  three-eighths  of  a  mile  wide  at  the  narrowest  point,  covered  by 
the  cross  fire  of  batteries  at  its  outer  mouth,  exposed  to  a  raking  fire 
from  the  peninsula,  piercing  its  inner  entrance,  and  sown,  if  need  be, 
with  submarine  mines.  Its  facilities:  An  ample  water  supply;  sites 
for  dry  docks  in  the  solid  rock  of  the  shore;  spaces  for  barracks,  maga- 
zines, and  storehouses  on  land  within  the  bay.  Its  exterior  resources: 
Distant  but  7  miles  from  a  city  of  30,000  inhabitants  and  on  an  island 
over  four  and  one-half  times  the  size  of  Malta,  with  a  consequent  supply 
of  meat,  vegetables,  and  fruits  in  abundance. 

It  would  seem  that  nature  has  given  military  strength  with  unspar- 
ing hand  to  Pearl  Harbor,  which,  in  a  strategic  sense,  is  really  Hawaii, 
and,  in  its  unparalleled  position  of  command,  is  essentially  the  "key 
of  the  Northern  Pacific." 

HAWAII'S  MILITARY  RESOURCES. 

In  measuring  the  power  of  a  naval  station  there  is  linked  with  the 
question  of  military  strength — although  not  an  essential  part  of  it,  as 
Gibraltar  so  conspicuously  shows  —  the  further  inquiry  as  to  its 
resources,  its  capacity  for  self-support,  if  cut  oft*  from  relief.  Especially 
is  this  a  problem  for  an  island  depot.  It  has  been  well  said  that  "every 
place  depending  on  the  sea  for  supplies  must  fall  to  the  power  in  com- 
mand of  the  sea." 


22 

Coal  and  timber  for  ship  needs  do  not  exist  in  Hawaii,  and  with 
them  there  must  be  supplied  ammunition,  the  metals,  and  naval  stores 
in  variety.  It  is  to  be  observed  also  that  the  island  products  are 
mainly  agricultural;  that  manufacturing  is,  almost  wholly,  a  missing 
industry. 

However,  modern  war,  by  sea  at  least,  is  far  too  swift  for  long  invest- 
ments. The  "Great  Siege"  of  Gibraltar — though  military  as  well  as 
naval — will  never  again  find  its  parallel  in  duration.  The  question  of 
resources  restricts  itself,  then,  to  food  supplies,  and — in  the  case  of  an 
island  such  as  Oahu.  of  which  the  naval  station  forms  but  a  part — to 
population,  since  the  latter,  with  complete  blockade,  must  be  fed,  and 
since,  also,  it  may  furnish  a  militia  to  aid  in  repelling  a  descent  upon 
the  laud. 

Oahu  is  not  a  large  island,  being  but  46  miles  long  and  25  broad, 
with  an  area  of  530  square  miles ;  it  is  parted  from  its  nearest  neighbor  "*. 
by  a  channel  23  miles  in  width,  one  and  one-half  times  that  of  Gibraltar 
Straits.  Crete,  in  the  Mediterranean,  is  more  than  six  times  Oahu's 
size;  and  in  view  of  the  recent  blockading  operations  of  the  Powers 
there,  the  possibility  of  Oahu's  investment  must  be  admitted.  On  the 
other  hand,  as  will  be  later  shown  herein,  the  probability  of  its  effective 
blockade  is  remote;  and  therefore  the  resources  of  a  fleet  and  garrison 
at  Pearl  Harbor  may  fairly  be  considered  as  drawn  from  all  the 
inhabited  islands  of  the  group. 

The  total  area  of  these  inhabited  islands  is  about  6,000  square  miles, 
or  over  three-fourths  that  of  the  State  of  Massachusetts.  Only  a  mod- 
erate proportion,  however,  of  the  laud  is  capable  of  supporting  a  dense 
population,  the  interior  parts  being  mountainous.  The  soil,  a  decom- 
posed lava,  is  fertile,  but  in  many  districts  requires  irrigation  from 
streams  or  wells.  The  principal  products  are  sugar,  rice,  coffee,  and 
tropical  fruits,  although  corn,  wheat,  potatoes,  and  leguminous  crops 
can  be  raised.  The  climate  is  mild  and  equable,  56°  and  88°  being  the 
winter  and  summer  extremes  of  temperature  at  sea  level. 

The  population,  according  to  the  census  of  1896,  is  109,020,  of  which 
28  percent  are  Hawaiians  and  22  per  cent  are  Americans  or  Europeans, 
by  birth  or  descent,  15,000  being  Portuguese.  The  remainder  comprises 
Asiatics  and  people  of  mixed  blood. 

As  to  the  population  of  the  future,  it  can  not  be  doubted  that,  with 
annexation  by  the  United  States  and  under  its  strong  and  stable  Gov- 
ernment, there  will  be  attraction  for  the  investment  of  capital  which 
has  not  existed  in  the  past.  Then,  doubtless,  the  internal  resources 
of  the  group  will  be  fully  developed  and  its  importance  be  increased 
largely  as  a  naval  post,  as  a  center  of  supplies  for  a  growing  merchant 
marine,  and  in  some  degree  as  a  market  of  exchange  for  the  commodi- 
ties of  Ocean ica  and  the  Asian  and  American  littorals.  This  devel- 
opment will  turn  to  these  islands  a  steadily  rising  immigration  of 
Americans  and  Europeans. 

With  regarp  to  the  possibility  of  supporting — from  native  resources 
if  need  be — these  future  inhabitants,  there  should  be  recalled  the  fact 
that  little  more  than  a  century  ago,  when  the  group  was  discovered  by 
Captain  Cook,  its  population  was  estimated  at  400,000;  and,  further, 
Mr.  W.  D.  Alexander,  survey  or- general,  states  that  upon  the  products 
of  the  soil  probably  five  times  the  present  number  (109,000)  could  be 
supported.  By  other  observers  this  estimate  is  doubled. 

Of  the  native  population  probably  50  per  cent,  or  15,000,  are  males, 
and  these  should  form  a  factor  of  importance  in  weighing  Hawaii's 
value  as  a  naval  station — for  a  time  only,  it  is  sad  to  say,  since  this  is  a 


23 

fast  dying  race.  Our  whalers  of  the  old  days  found  the  Hawaiian  the 
best  boatman  and  sailor  in  the  world — traits  transmitted  from  fore- 
fathers, who,  if  tradition  be  true,  were  bold  and  skillful  navigators, 
steering  by  the  stars  to  distant  groups.  In  such  degree  does  the 
Hawaiian  love  the  sea  that  in  1850  the  island  government  passed  a  law 
restricting  young  men  from  leaving  its  territory,  since  the  charms  of 
seafaring  were  robbing  the  country  of  its  people. 

In  summing  up  Hawaii's  military  resources  in  inhabitants  and  food 
products,  we  find  in  a  territory  about  three- fourths  the  size  of  Massa- 
chusetts, with  a  climate  well  suited  to  the  Anglo-Saxon,  a  population  of 
but  109,000,  of  which  22,000  are  Americans  or  Europeans,  31,(MK)  are 
II  a  \vaiia  i  is.  and  the  remainder  are  of  Asian  or  mixed  blood.  It  appears, 
further,  that  the  islands  are  capable  of  supporting  from  half  a  million 
to  double  that  number,  and  that  from  the  Hawaiians  there  may  be 
drawn,  for  the  present  at  least,  a  considerable  force  of  men  especially 
lifted  for  service  on  the  sea.  Hawaii's  capacity  for  self  support,  if  cut 
oft' for  a  time  from  relief,  is  manifest,  and  there  seems  clear,  also,  its 
power  to  aid  in  a  considerable  degree  in  repelling  descent  upon  its 
territory. 

HAWAII  AS  THE   GIBRALTAR   OF   THE  PACIFIC. 

Hawaii  has  been  called  the  "  Gibraltar  of  the  Pacific,"  but  the  compar- 
ison with  the  lost  rock  of  Spain  is  to  some  extent  misleading.  That 
Gibraltar  holds  a  position  of  extraordinary  strategic  value  is  of  course 
beyond  question.  On  a  narrow  strait  and  forming  in  part  the  very 
gateway  of  the  Mediterranean,  it  dominates  all  trade  to  and  from  the 
Atlantic  and  this  inland  sea,  including  the  vast  traffic  on  the  modern 
highway  to  the  East. 

In  war  it  will  part  the  coasts,  the  ports,  and  the  fleets  of  Spain,  and 
will  exercise  the  same  important  function  with  regard  to  France, 
although  in  less  degree,  since  it  is  relatively  far  from  her  shores. 
Again,  its  position  enables  it  to  watch,  and  to  some  extent  obstruct, 
the  egress  to  the  Atlantic  of  the  ships  of  Italy,  Austria,  and  Turkev. 
with  as  well  those  of  Russia's  Black  Sea  squadron  when  the  latter 
shall  decide  to  break  the  treaty  bonds  of  the  Bosporus. 

In  military  strength  it  is — purely  as  a  fortress — without  superior, 
resembling  an  island  so  nearly  that  attack  by  land  is  of  tritli.  g 
avail,  and  indeed  is  wholly  impossible  if  there  be  a  defensive  naval 
force  in  the  bay.  When  Sir  George  Rooke  took  it  in  1704,  his  success 
was  due  only  to  the  sudden  rush  of  a  powerful  squadron  carrying 
nearly  10,000  men,  1,800  of  whom  were  troops,  against  a  most  inefficient 
garrison,  but  150  in  number,  and  unsupported  from  the  sea. 

Later,  during  the  "Great  Siege,"  begun  in  1779  and  lasting  for  more 
than  three  and  a  half  years,  it  was  held  successfully  by  a  foice  which 
did  not  exceed  7,000  men,  although  the  assaults  culminated  in  the 
simultaneous  attack  of  land  batteries  comprising  24(i  guns  and  mor- 
tars, supported  by  an  army  of  40,000  men,  and  of  the  combined  fleets 
of  France  and  Spain,  numbering  47  sail  of  the  line,  with  many  smaller 
vessels. 

When,  however,  there  is  considered  the  cardinal  function  of  a  sea 
fortress — its  ability  to  guard  fully  a  fleet — Gibraltar  is  found  wanting. 
The  rock  is  a  bold  headland,  forming  about  one-half  the  eastern  side  of 
a  bay  but  8  miles  long  and  5  broad,  the  remainder  of  whose  shoies — 
east,  north  and  west — is  Spanish  territory.  The  anchorage  is  far  from 
good,  since  the  bay  has  a  \udely  gaping  mouth  and  its  waters  are 
exposed  to  the  strong  current  setting  in  from  the  straits,  to  the  south- 


24 

west  wind  for  which  the  latter  form  a  funnel,  and  to  the  terrible  gusts 
of  the  Levanter.  Protection  for  a  fleet  does  not  exist  naturally,  and  is 
possible  artificially  in  but  limited  degree,  save  from  the  batteries 
above  them.  The  "ships  cluster  at  the  base  of  the  great  rock  like  chicks 
huddling  about  a  wingless  hen. 

As  to  natural  military  resources,  there  are  none.  With  an  adequate 
garrison  and  munitions  of  war  Gibraltar  has  therefore  but  one  danger — 
famine — whose  gaunt  specter  has  hovered  so  often  above  the  rock.  In 
the  absence  of  relief  it  must,  if  food  fail,  fall  to  any  hostile  power 
which  may  command  the  sea.  The  grave  necessity  for  extreme  restric- 
tion of  all  population  save  that  essential  to  the  wants  of  the  garrison 
is  shown  by  a  series  of  regulations  which  refuse  to  recognize  the  right 
of  residence,  with  as  well  the  right  of  admission  to  aliens,  and  which 
order  every  possible  prevention  of  increase  in  noneffective  population. 

The  political  and  commercial  conditions  of  this  day  may  make 
Hawaii's  strategic  position  of  less  value  than  that  of  Gibraltar;  but 
the  future  may  change  this.  As  to  other  requisites  of  a  naval  station, 
it  need  only  be  said  that  it  is  capable  of  guarding,  not  a  fleet,  but  a 
whole  navy,  in  a  position  which  may  easily  be  made  unassailable  from 
the  sea,  and  which,  properly  fortified,  will  be  also  impregnable,  prob- 
ably, to  land  attack;  and  further,  that  its  natural  resources,  for  mili- 
tary ends,  seem  abundant,  giving  it  ample  means  of  self-support  if  cut 
off  from  friendly  aid. 

HAWAII'S  FUNCTIONS  IN  WAR. 

If  Hawaii  shall  be  annexed  by  the  United  States,  the  conclusion  is 
inevitable  that,  in  the  event  of  maritime  war  being  waged  against  us, 
the  island  group  will  be  the  scene  of  the  earliest,  perhaps  the  only,  con- 
flict on  Pacific  waters.  It  will  be  the  first  line  of  defense  of  Pacific 
and  Alaskan  shores,  the  far-flung  outpost,  on  guard,  not  in  our  own 
nor  neutral  territory,  but  in  that  uNo  Man's  Land,"  the  sea.  The 
danger  and  the  glory  of  this  advanced  position  will  lie  in  this,  that 
its  garrison  and  fleet  must  meet  the  first  rush  of  attack,  that  its  peo- 
ple, in  their  vicarious  suffering,  must  shield  those  of  the  real  objective, 
the  continental  shore. 

The  fact  that  Hawaii's  situation  and  environment  make  it  the  only 
sea  base  from  which  that  shore  can  be  assailed  has  been  made  clear 
herein.  In  this  regard  the  Atlantic  offers  no  parallel.  To  reproduce 
on  the  Eastern  coast  the  safeguarding  which  Hawaii's  annexation 
will  give  the  West  the  United  States  would  need  to  acquire  many  of 
the  Atlantic  islands  and  much  of  that  ocean's  farther  shore. 

From  the  very  beginnings  of  naval  warfare,  while  laws  for  its  conduct 
were  yet  undreamed  of,  there  seems  to  have  been  an  instinctive  desire 
to  hold  near  the  land  to  be  assailed  a  naval  base,  to  have  there  sheltered 
waters  where  vessels  might  refit  to  sally  forth  again.  Thus,  in  our 
civil  war,  Port  Eoyal  served  as  the  home  harbor  of  the  ships  which 
bombarded  or  blockaded  ports  to  north  and  south  of  it.  Disregard  of 
this  primary  requirement  as  to  a  base  but  invites  disaster.  Indeed, 
in  history  there  seems  no  record  of  successful  attack  made  against 
worthy  defense  from  a  remote  base  of  operations.  So,  if  Hawaii  shall 
enter  the  Union  and  in  an  extreme  of  national  unwisdom  shall  be 
left  unfortified  and  unguarded,  the  aim  of  any  Pacific  force  will  be,  first, 
to  seize  its  superb  war  harbor  and  then,  thus  intrenched,  to  attack  the 
coast  at  will. 

On  the  other  hand,  if  the  United  States  shall  utilize  the  natural 


25 

strength  of  the  group,  and  if,  in  doubtful  days,  there  shall  be  stationed 
in  its  waters  a  Heet  of  fighting  strength,  adequately  equipped  with 
battle  ships — the  representatives  in  this  age  of  Torrington's  ships,  "fit 
to  lie  in  a  line'1 — a  hostile  force  seeking  the  Pacific  coast  will  be  subject 
to  one  of  the  primary  laws  of  territorial  attack,  namely,  that  to  secure 
success  the  assailant's  command  of  the  sea  must  previously  be  assured. 
"Command,"  in  such  case,  means  at  least  "a  reasonable  probability 
that  no  naval  force,  capable  of  interfering  by  sea,  can  make  its  appear- 
ance before  the  completion  of  all  the  objects  named  in  the  attack." 

This  command  of  the  sea  could  not  be  attained  by  the  enemy  until 
the  Hawaiian  fleet  was  vanquished  or  blockaded,  since  the  coast  of  the 
United  States  is  within  easy  range  of  that  fleet.  Such  conditions  seem 
improbable;  the  unwisdom  of  stationing  any  but  a  strong  force  in 
Hawaii  at  critical  times  will  be  apparent,  and  that  force  will  operate 
from  a  nearby  base  against  foes  which  have  come  far  to  find  it.  The 
stupendous  victory  of  Howard,  Drake,  and  Hawkins  over  the  Spanish 
Armada,  the  annihilation  of  the  French  at  the  battle  of  the  Nile,  and 
the  crushing  defeat  of  the  Italian  Admiral  Persano  at  Lissa  during  the 
Austro- Italian  war  of  1866  are  conspicuous,  often  cited,  examples  of  the 
disaster  which  follows  a  violation  of  the  law  that  territorial  attack  must 
be  preceded  by  control  of  the  sea.  The  essence,  however,  of  Hawaii's 
defensive  value  to  the  United  States  is  its  position  as  the  only  sea  base 
from  which  the  coast  can  be  assailed.  With  that  sea  base  securely 
guarded,  the  control  of  the  sea,  under  present  conditions  of  fuel  and 
distance  on  the  Pacific,  is  secondary,  as  far  as  Hawaii  is  concerned, 
although  in  itself  important. 

It  may  be  urged  that  a  United  States  fleet  on  its  own  coast  will  con- 
trol adjacent  waters,  or  at  least  make  uncertain  hostile  control  of  them, 
and  that  therefore  Hawaii's  aid  in  restricting  territorial  attack  is  not 
essential.  This  is  quite  true,  so  far  as  the  range  and  fighting  strength 
of  that  fleet  extend.  It  must  be  remembered,  however,  that  a  coast 
fleet  will  have  a  coast  base,  and  that  without  the  islands  the  coast — 
not  distant  Hawaii — will  meet  the  loss  and  suffering  of  naval  war. 
Again,  that  coast  is  widely  extended,  it  is  not  easly  guarded  through- 
out save  by  a  great  fleet,  and  the  enemy's  force  may  take  war's  chances — 
as  in  the  capture  of  Gibraltar — and  make  a  sudden  raid  before  advanc- 
ing to  meet  the  defense,  while  with  Hawaii  there  may  be  concentration 
of  force,  the  minimum  of  watching,  and  a  sea  whose  command  must  be 
battled  for  by  any  foe. 

Again,  without  Hawaii  there  will  be  but  one  great  line  of  defense 
afloat;  with  it  there  will  be  two.  Lastly,  and  most  important  by  far, 
the  islands  in  the  grip  of  a  foreign  nation,  with  adequate  force  there, 
will  make  the  command  of  the  north  Pacific  doubtful  for  all  time,  a 
thing  for  which  in  war  the  United  States  must  fight.  With  Hawaii 
that  command  is  ours.  We  have  that  possession,  which  is  so  many 
points  of  the  law. 

As  the  guard  port  for  a  naval  force  of  proper  strength  and  coini)osition, 
Hawaii  will  become  the  watchtower  of  the  northern  Pacific.  When 
war  clouds  lower,  swift  cruisers,  "the  eyes  of  the  fleet,"  radiating  from 
Pearl  Harbor,  will  scour  the  seas  in  any  quarter  from  which  an  enemy 
threatens,  and  from  these  scouts  word  will  come  quickly  to  the  fighting 
fleets,  at  Hawaii  or  at  San  Francisco,  of  the  force  and  course  of  any 
approaching  foe. 

It  is  not  assumed  that  even  a  most  vigilant  watch  of  this  kind  could 
cover,  with  entire  effectiveness,  so  great  an  expanse  of  sea,  but  it  is 
clear  that  from  Hawaii  the  most  practicable,  and,  considering  the  area, 


26 

a  most  valuable,  system  of  watch  and  ward  may  be  maintained.  If 
there  were  established  near  Unalaska,  directly  north  of  Hawaii,  a 
fortified  port  at  which  an  American  squadron  could  rendezvous  in 
safety,  the  western  and  southern  limits  of  the  great  quadrant  of  sea, 
whose  center  is  Hawaii  and  which  confronts  our  Alaskan  and  Western 
shores,  could  be  traversed  by  these  swift  messengers  proceeding  south- 
ward from  Unalaska  and  westward  from  San  Francisco,  meeting  and 
passing  in  mid  ocean,  within  forty-eight  hours  from  the  start,  cruisers 
on  similar  duty  from  Hawaii.  A  moderate  increase  above  the  bare 
essentials  noted  in  this  scouting  squadron  would  make  a  boundary 
patrol  of  unquestionable  value. 

During  the  reign  of  Queen  Elizabeth  the  French  Court  commissioned 
the  first  privateers  of  naval  history  tQ  prey  on  England's  merchant 
marine.  The  Queen  retorted  in  kind;  and,  from  those  early  years, 
commerce  destroying  assumed  a  place  in  naval  war.  Later,  the  guerre 
de  course,  as  the  French  term  it.  was  made,  for  them,  famous  for  all 
time  by  their  mighty  leaders  in  this  form  of  attack — Forbin,  Jean  Bart, 
Duguay-Frouiu,  and  those  who  followed.  To  this  day  this  element  of 
warfare  has,  perhaps,  its  strongest  advocates  in  France. 

For  such  work,  cruisers  must  have  extreme  speed;  armament  and 
armor  are  sacrificed  to  propelling  machinery;  militarily,  therefore,  they 
are  but  less  weak  than  the  merchantmen  they  seek.  Again,  to  save 
weight  for  machinery,  they  are  often  unsheathed,  thus  requiring  fre- 
quent docking  to  cleanse  their  hulls.  Finally,  great  speed  implies  large 
coal  consumption.  Their  weakness  against  fighting  ships,  their  neces- 
sities as  to  frequent  dockings  and  renewal  of  coal  supply,  all  point  to 
near-by  guarded  ports  of  refuge,  as  essential  for  their  success  on  any 
field. 

In  this,  again,  Pearl  Harbor's  strength  and  central  situation  will  give 
it  extraordinary  value  for  the  power  which  holds  it  when  war  shall 
come  on  the  Pacific.  As  has  been  shown,  it  is  directly  on,  or  in  a 
strong  position  to  flank,  every  trade  route  in  the  northern  section  of 
that  ocean.  Cruisers  from  it  can  speed  with  ease  over  every  ocean 
highway  there,  and  still  be  within  ready  reach  of  refuge,  of  docking, 
and  of  fuel. 

In  the  event  of  foreign  war,  perhaps  the  most  formidable  problem 
which  will  confront  the  United  States — after  providing  for  defense — 
will  be  its  inability  to  make  its  power  felt  abroad,  except  in  a  moral 
sense.  Owing  to  the  lack  of  coaling  stations,  our  fleet,  practically,  has 
a  string  tied  to  it;  it  is  like  that  toy  of  childhood,  the  returning  ran; 
it  may  proceed  to  sea  until  half  its  coal  is  spent,  and  then  with  the 
remainder  it  must  return  to  port  to  refill  for  a  second  limited  sally. 

It  should  be  borne  in  mind,  therefore,  that  possession  of  Hawaii  will 
advance  our  outposts  by  2,000  miles  toward  Asian  shores ;  that  by  this 
distance  there  will  be  increased  the  range  of  the  fleet  in  war  against 
any  over-sea  Pacific  foe.  With  this  it  may  be  well,  too,  to  recall  that 
in  1807  the  United  States  acquired  Midway  Island,  1,200  miles  to  the 
westward  of  Honolulu,  with  the  intention  of  establishing  a  naval  station 
there.  The  cost  of  such  a  port  might  be  large,  but  the  future  may 
justify  the  wisdom  of  the  expenditure,  since  if  Hawaii  be  annexed 
Midway  could  be  readily  supported  from  Pearl  Harbor,  and  the  trans- 
pacific effectiveness  of  our  fleet  would  be  increased  by  1,200  miles  more, 
thus  bridging,  largely,  that  wide  ocean  for  warfare  over  sea. 

The  serious  dangers  which  may  in  war  beset  Hawaii  as  American 
territory  are  the  interruption  of  its  communications  with  the  United 
States  and  the  blockade  of  the  cost  of  Oahu,  the  island  on  which  Pearl 


27 

Harbor  and  Honolulu  are  situated.  Communications  are  both  the 
arteries  and  the  nerves  of  strategy,  since  through  them  not  only  is  a 
distant  force  supported  but  its  action  is  controlled.  Hawaii,  it  is  true, 
is  2,100  miles  from  the  continent;  but  since  1842  England  has  held 
Hongkong,  an  island  distant  from  her  by  half  a  world,  parted  from  an 
alien  and  unfriendly  shore  by  but  a  narrow  pass,  and  separated  by 
1,500  miles  of  sea  from  Singapore,  the  nearest  British  station,  a  port 
which  at  no  time  has  had  imposing  strength,  military  or  naval. 

With  annexation  and  war  at  any  time  thereafter,  the  maintenance  of 
communication  with  Hawaii  will  therefore  present  no  problems  either 
novel  or  of  surpassing  difficulty.  There  will  be  an  ocean  cable  to  guard, 
reinforcements  to  forward,  supply  ships  to  convoy;  but  the  road  is 
straight,  it  is  Hanked  by  no  island  foe,  the  distance  is  not  excessive, 
and  the  question  becomes  one  only  of  adequate  force  and  proper  vigi- 
lance in  sea  patrol. 

With  regard  to  the  possible  blockade  of  Oahu,  it  must  be  admitted 
that  on  the  neighboring  island  of  Hawaii,  within  twelve  or  fifteen 
hours  of  easy  steaming,  there  is  situated  the  port  of  Ililo,  an  open  bay 
7£  miles  long  and  .'i  wide,  exposed  to  the  northeast  trades,  but  having 
sheltered  anchorage  in  5  to  7  fathoms  of  water.  This  harbor  would 
serve  as  that  indispensable  requisite  of  blockade,  a  neighboring  base, 
where  a  part  of  the  force  may  lie  ready  to  relieve  the  ships  on  guard, 
and  where  the  latter  may  retire  for  repairs,  for  supplies,  and  for  that 
rest  which  will  be  vital  to  the  efficiency  of  officers  and  men  subjected 
while  on  watch  to  the  most  intense  strain,  bodily  and  mental,  which  a 
naval  force  must  meet. 

On  the  other  hand,  precipitous  hills  rise  back  of  Hilo,  and  it  may  be 
fairly  fortified  for  defense.  A  hostile  fleet  to  reach  it  must  traverse  a 
wide  stretch  of  ocean  and  will  arrive  with  hulls  foul  and  sea  worn.  Its 
supplies  must  follow  the  same  path.  And  before  Hilo  is  taken  the 
enemy  must  meet  a  fleet — strong  or  weak,  as  the  case  may  be,  but 
fully  equipped — operating  from  the  impregnable  base  of  Pearl  Harbor. 
Under  these  conditions  the  establishment  of  the  blockade  of  Oahu 
would  seem  most  improbable,  except  with  overwhelming  force. 

Even  conceding  the  possibility  of  temporary  blockade,  through  sur- 
prise or  otherwise,  it  could  hardly  be  enduring  if  there  be  a  torpedo 
squadron  in  Pearl  Harbor.  In  the  opinion  of  a  growing  body  of  naval 
men,  the  battle  ship,  which  must  form  the  backbone  of  a  blockading 
force,  is  no  match  for  the  torpedo  vessel,  which  is  preeminently  the 
weapon  of  the  imprisoned  fleet.  The  armorclad  may  sink  one  or  two 
of  these  small  and  deadly  craft,  but  she  can  not  repel  the  attack  of  a 
swarm  of  them  in  the  gloom  of  a  moonless  night  or  the  gray,  of  an 
early  dawn. 

If  Hawaii  shall  become  American  territory,  it  would  appear  that 
Pearl  Harbor's  functions,  offensive  and  defensive,  in  war  on  the  Pacific, 
will  be  of  grave  importance.  As  our  most  distant  outpost,  in  the  fore- 
most line  of  defense,  it  will  meet  the  first  assault  and  may  shield  the 
continental  coast  from  the  suffering  of  war;  as  a  central  and  impreg- 
nable base,  it  will  enable  an  adequate  fleet  to  command  the  seas  which 
face  our  Western  and  Alaskan  shores;  as  the  watch  tower  of  the 
northern  Pacific,  it  will  give  timely  warning  of  the  coming  of  any  foe; 
it  will  dominate  all  ocean  highways  from  Alaska  to  the  equator,  and 
give  unsurpassed  facilities  for  the  attack  and  defense  of  commerce;  and, 
lastly,  it  will  advance  our  outposts  by  2,000  miles  toward  Asian  shores, 
increasing  by  that  distance  the  range  of  our  fleet  in  war  beyond  the 
sea. 


28 

OUR  OPPORTUNITY  ON  THE   PACIFIC. 

"Peaceful,  gain-loving,"  a  critic  lias  said  of  the  people  of  the  United 
States.  JS7ay,  rather,  the  words  should  be  "slow  to  auger."  and  gain- 
spending  in  any  righteous  cause !  It  was  in  the  year  1832  that  Andrew 
Jackson  issued  his  nullification  proclamation;  but  not  until  1801, 
nearly  a  generation  later,  was  there  begun  the  armed  conflict  which 
was  to  end  those  differences  between  brave  and  honest  men,  both  of 
the  North  and  South,  of  which  his  stirring  words  were  the  first  official 
sign.  That  conflict,  too,  was  the  great  war  of  modern  times — lavish  in 
blood,  in  treasure,  in  mourning  homes,  in  fair  Southern  fields  laid 
waste.  One  needs  "but  to  recall  the  memories  of  Valley  Forge  and 
New  Orleans,  of  Buena  Vista  and  Gettysburg,  to  know  that  beneath 
the  nation's  seeming  unconcern,  its  laughter,  its  eager,  rushing  life, 
there  lies  a  pride  which,  though  tempered  with  much  modern  common 
sense,  is  yet  stern  and  haughty;  which  does  not  pale  before  that  of  any 
people  on  whose  broad  banner  the  sun  has  ever  shone. 

The  military  value  of  Hawaii  in  defense  has  been  set  forth  herein; 
yet,  to  a  nation  which,  not  by  the  right  of  the  stronger,  but  "with 
malice  toward  none,"  has  won  its  exalted  place,  and  which  may  fitly 
glory  in  its  marvelous  advancement,  are  there  not  other  reasons  than 
defense,  than  mere  territorial  expansion,  for  the  acquirement  of  these 
distant  islands?  Far-sighted  statesmen  have  given  the  little  England 
of  the  old  time  a  greater  Britain  now.  If  our  leaders  shall  but  have 
clear  vision  and  wise  daring,  what  may  not  a  golden  future  have  in 
store  for  the  greater  United  States  of  the  centuries  that  are  to  come? 

It  is  now  nearly  three  hundred  years  since,  from  a  dark  dungeon  in 
the  Tower,  Sir  Walter  Raleigh,  one  of  the  most  splendid  figures  of  a 
brilliant  time,  looked  down  the  ages  with  unstinted  gaze,  and  marked 
out  the  path  on  which  a  maritime  State  shall  find  its  power  and  its 
glory. 

"For  whosoever  commands  the  sea,"  he  said,  "commands  the  trade; 
whosoever  commands  the  trade  of  the  world,  commands  the  riches  of 
the  world,  and  consequently  the  world  itself." 

Raleigh's  thought  stirs  British  statesmen  at  this  hour.  That  is  the 
inspiration  which  gives  the  island  empire  its  enormous  merchant 
marine;  its  stations  guarding  every  ocean  highway  and  carrying  Eng- 
land's morning  drumbeat  round  the  world;  its  mighty  war  fleets,  grim 
and  threatening,  orr  every  sea. 

What  of  the  United  States  ?  It  is  the  greatest  producer  of  the  nations 
of  the  earth.  After  feeding  70  millions  of  its  own  and  supplying  its 
own  whirring  spindles,  it  has  a  vast  surplus  to  send  nbroad,  of  grain 
from  the  West,  meat  from  the  plains,  and  cotton  from  th"!  South.  Its 
manufacturing  facilities,  too,  are  unequaled  in  the  amount  and  char- 
acter of  machinery,  and  its  export  of  manufactured  products  increases 
year  by  year.  The  order  of  Scotch  carpenters  has  just  boycotted  mill- 
work  from  the  United  States,  and  the  enmity  of  English  machinists 
against  American  tools  and  tool-making  machines  has  produced  a  most 
serious  labor  crisis.  Again,  the  vast  wealth  of  the  United  States  makes 
it  a  consumer  as  well  as  a  producer;  it  has  a  market  that  the  world 
strives  for  and  which  takes  much  from  other  lands. 

On  the  path  of  national  development,  such  a  surplus,  such  exports, 
such  imports  point,  with  unerring  hand,  to  a  merchant  marine  for  the 
carriage  of  our  sales  and  purchases,  to  sea  stations  for  the  supply  and 
refuge  of  that  shipping,  and  to  a  guarding  fleet,  the  watchman  of  com- 
merce on  the  ocean.  Yet  of  these  the  United  States  has  but  the  fleet, 


29 

and  that  of  limited  power  for  defense  alone.  The  cost  of  the  civil  war 
.-(•••ins  enormous;  but,  in  freight  and  passenger  tolls  and  in  the  profits  of 
the  shipbuilders  employed  for  its  transoceanic  needs,  the  nation  is  now 
paving  into  foreign  purses  300  million  dollars  a  year — nearly  half  the 
average  cost  per  annum  of  that  war  during  the  four  years  of  its 
existence. 

Long  ago  Baron  von  Humboldt  predicted  that  the  commerce  of  the 
Pacific  would  in  time  rival  that  of  the  Atlantic.  Later,  Thomas  H. 
Ben  ton  declared  that  "the  dominion  and  empire  of  the  world  lay  along 
the  route  to  the  Indies  and  with  the  country  which  controlled  the  com- 
merce over  it,"  and  that  road  stretches  broad  and  clear  across  the 
Pacific's  wide  expanse.  Later  still,  William  H.  Seward  said  that  the 
commercial  and  political  importance  of  the  Atlantic  would  ultimately 
fade  before  that  of  the  Pacific;  and  the  great  Secretary  mated  his 
words  with  deeds  in  the  purchase  of  the  imperial  territory  of  Alaska. 

The  Pacific's  sleep  is  ended.  On  its  eastern  boundary  the  swift 
growth  of  the  Western  States  of  the  Union,  the  finding  of  gold  in 
Alaska,  and  the  completion  of  the  Canadian  Pacific  Railway,  all  mark 
the  awakening.  To  the  westward  Japan  has  dashed  like  a  meteor  into 
the  international  sky,  Russia  has  become  a  Pacific  power,  and  China 
and  Korea  blink,  sleepy-eyed,  at  the  rising  sun. 

The  distant  islands  have  been  seized  from  the  equator  to  Australia, 
and  above  the  uttermost  of  them,  if  it  be  of  possible  value  commer- 
cially or  strategically,  there  floats  the  ensign  of  some  European  power. 
"More  than  one-half  the  population  of  the  world  is  in  countries  front- 
ing the  Pacific  and  Indian  oceans,"  says  the  Hon.  John  R.  Procter,  and 
he  estimates  the  foreign  commerce  of  these  countries,  excluding  North 
America,  at  over  2£  billions  of  dollars  per  year. 

Ileie,  then,  in  Hawaii  and  on  the  Pacific,  is  the  opportunity  of  a 
proud,  aspiring  nation ;  not  in  feeding  the  land  hunger  of  mere  territo- 
rial aggrandizement,  but  in  following  a  noble  pathway  of  commercial 
expansion.  The  islands  must  soon  go  to  some  strong  power.  They 
have  been  held  so  long  for  America  only  by  the  unconquerable  pluck 
of  Americans.  The  Hawaiian  people,  the  gentle  race  of  reef  and  palm, 
is  fading  fast.  Their  lands  must  fall  "to  uuliueal  hands,  no  sous  of 
theirs  succeeding." 

Will  the  United  States,  moved  by  what  John  W.  Foster  stigmatizes 
as  a  spirit  of  "national  self-abnegation,"  refuse  a  gift,  which,  in  his 
wise  foreknowledge,  James  G.  Elaine  descried  for  tile  nation  as  "the 
key  to  the  dominion  of  the  American  Pacific?" 

In  glowing  words  Murat  Halstead  has  said : 

Once  the  Alleghanien  were  our  western  horizon;  but  wo  have  crossed  the  space 
that  divided  the  discoveries  of  Columbus  from  the  lands  of  his  dreams,  where  the 
East  and  the  West  are  blended,  like  sea  and  sky,  in  the  boundless  bine  of  the  waters 
and  the  air.  Shall  we  retreat  when  onr  colors  stream  and  shine  iu  the  zeuith  of  the 
arch  under  which  is  our  planet's  path f 

THE  ANNEXATION  OP  HAWAII. 

Kecent  events  in  the  history  of  lands  bordering  the  Pacific  Ocean 
give  added  strength  to  the  strategic  reasons  favoring  the  annexation 
of  Hawaii,  which  have  existed  almost  since  the  United  States  was  a 
nation  and  which  have  had  full  force  since  the  conquest  and  purchase 
of  California. 

To  the  westward,  the  acquisition  by  Germany  of  a  commanding  posi- 
tion on  the  Shantung  promontory;  the  rumored  desire  for  Hainan  by 


30 

another  government;  with  the  occupation,  since  1842,  of  Hongkong  by 
the  British,  all  point  to  the  seemingly  inevitable  Europeauiziug  of  the 
long  littoral  of  China.  Northward  of  that  empire,  Kussia  marches 
steadily  on;  pushing  her  Siberian  railway  to  completion;  extending 
her  already  vast  resources  and  strength  at  Vladivostock ;  wintering 
her  fleet  at  Port  Arthur;  and  apparently  entering  into  the  affairs, 
domestic  and  foreign,  of  the  Korean  peninsula.  The  fleet  of  Japan, 
too,  has  had,  and  still  has,  phenomenal  growth;  she  has  made  Formosa 
her  territory;  and,  if  her  new  role  as  the  England  of  the  East  be  ade- 
quately filled,  other  island  territory  may  fall  to  her  before  the  disturbed 
balance  of  power  in  the  Orient  shall  cease  to  oscillate  and  shall  settle 
into  quiet  for  a  time. 

In  place,  then,  of  facing  China,  peaceful  and  in  war  inert,  with  no 
force  to  dispatch  far  afield  by  sea  or  land,  and  Japan,  eager,  brilliant, 
but  yet  young  and  weak,  there  will  presently  confront  the  United 
States  on  its  western  as  well  as  its  eastern  shore  the  powers  of  Europe, 
with  their  relatively  large  fleets  and  home  reserves,  established  not 
not  only  in  the  Far  East,  but  in  many  of  the  nearer  Pacific  islands,  the 
acquisition  of  which  in  these  later  years  has  been  not  a  ''blind  grab 
for  territory,"  but  in  pursuit  of  definite  strategic  aims.  To  these  forces 
on  the  west  there  must  be  added  also  that  of  the  new  Japan,  whose 
navy  will  soon  surpass  our  own  in  fighting  power. 

It  is  true  that  we  are  wholly  at  peace  with  these  nations,  and  that 
since  the  United  States  desires  no  Asiatic  territory,  but  is  interested 
only  in  the  full  maintenance  of  its  treaty  rights  with  Eastern  peoples, 
there  would  seem  to  be  no  probable  cause  for  a  clash.  Yet  modern 
war  is  sometimes  like  a  "thief  in  the  night,"  coming  swiftly  and  with- 
out warning.  Jomini,  a  master  of  strategy,  has  said :  "  No  enemy  is  so 
insignificant  as  to  be  despised  or  neglected  by  any  power,  however 
formidable."  A  wise  state  should  apply  the  same  reasoning  to  possible 
foes.  Again,  he  says:  "  Iron  weighs  at  least  as  much  as  gold  in  the 
scale  of  military  strength" — an  answer  wholly  apt  to  the  argument  of 
those  who,  calm  in  the  consciousness  of  present  peace,  would  rely  upon 
the  unsurpassed  wealth  of  the  United  States  and  our  limitless  resources 
to  meet  the  stress  of  sudden  war,  remembering  the  "  gold  "  only  and 
forgetting  the  vital  "iron"  of  military  strength. 

And  so,  while  at  this  time  we  are  wholly  at  peace  on  the  Pacific,  and 
the  breadth  of  that  wide  ocean  lies  between  us  and  the  arsenals  of 
nations  which  ma^  sometime  be  hostile  to  us,  yet  it  must  be  remem- 
bered that  in  a  moment  peace  may  fade  and  that  Hawaii  bridges  the 
stretch  of  sea  which,  without  the  island  group,  would  be — at  this  stage 
in  the  development  of  marine  propulsion — impassable  to  an  enemy's 
fleet.  Pearl  Harbor  is  the  sole  key  to  the  full  defense  of  our  Western 
shore,  and  that  key  should  lie  in  our  grasp  only. 

Again,  the  sudden  and  wholly  unforeshadowed  development  of  Alaska 
which  the  gold  discoveries  of  the  Klondike  probably  presage  adds  a 
new  element  of  commanding  importance  to  the  problem  of  Pacific 
defense — supremacy,  if  you  will.  It  seems  not  unlikely  that  this  Terri- 
tory will  repeat  the  history  of  California — first  the  wild  rush  for  gold, 
then  abnormal  growth  in  tributary  industries,  then  a  wholesome  and 
rapid  expansion  on  natural  lines.  It  is  true  that  Alaska  has  neither 
the  sunny  vineyards,  the  teeming  fruit  gardens,  nor  the  broad  and 
fertile  fields  of  California ;  but,  of  its  resources  which  are  known,  it 
may  be  said  that,  in  addition  to  its  possibilities,  nay,  surety  of  much 
sold,  it  holds,  the  world's  greatest  reserve  of  timber,  its  lands  are  full 


31 

of  coal,  the  finest  grazing  land  for  cattle,  and  its  fisheries  are  unsur- 
passed. 

Disregarding,  however,  the  uncertainties  of  future  development,  let 
us  consider  solely  the  necessities,  now  plainly  apparent,  of  the  gold- 
seeker.  While  a  multitude  of  the  latter  seem  to  be  preparing  for  the 
new  El  Dorado  many  must  fail  to  find  it  owing  to  the  lack,  for  the  time 
at  least,  of  transportation  facilities.  The  problem  of  the  carriage  of 
even  a  fraction  of  the  waiting  throng  over  the  miles  of  sea  and  river  to 
the  Klondike  is  one  involving  for  the  present  the  gravest  dillirulties. 
The  distance  from  Seattle  to  St.  Michaels  is  L',500  miles  by  sea,  and 
after  the  latter  port  is  reached  there  are  still  2,500  miles  of  the  Yukou 
to  traverse  by  river  steamers,  which  as  yet  do  not  exist. 

With  each  Alaskan  emigrant  from  Seattle  there  inust  go  a  ton  of 
supplies  for  clothing  and  sustenance,  a  ton  of  fuel  for  his  warmth  during 
one  winter,  and  a  considerable  weight  of  lumber  for  his  housing.  To 
these  there  must  be  added  materials  of  construction  for  the  great 
number  of  small  and  light  draft  Yukon  steamers  yet  to  be  transported 
in  sections  to,  and  erected  upon,  the  banks  of  that  river,  and  the  fuel  for 
the  use  of  this  river  fleet,  which  will  average  not  less  than  two  tons  for 
each  gold  miner  and  his  baggage,  stores,  lumber,  etc.  According  to  a 
conservative  estimate,  embracing  all  of  the  items  noted  above,  to  trans- 
port 50,000  men,  with  the  necessary  stores,  fuel,  and  materials,  will 
require  an  ocean  service  giving  at  least  one  arrival  per  day  at  St. 
Michaels  of  large  steamers  from  Seattle  during  the  five  mouths  of 
available  summer  weather. 

One  arrival  per  day  means,  as  well,  an  average  of  one  departure  per 
day.  At  15  knots  speed,  steamers  will  cover  the  distance  of  -,000  miles 
between  the  two  ports  in  seven  days.  Admitting  the  premises,  as 
above,  there  will  then  be  always  en  route,  during  the  time  noted,  four- 
teen large  steamers,  or  their  equivalent  in  a  greater  number  of  smaller 
and  slower  vessels,  steam  or  sail'— those  outward  bound  carrying  stores, 
without  which  the  Yukon  settlers  will  perish  and  our  interests  there  be 
destroyed  ;  those  returning  freighted,  it  is  hoped,  like  the  galleons  of 
old  Spain,  with  much  treasure,  wrested  by  herculean  toil  from  a  frozen 
and  unyielding  soil. 

In  the  event  of  conflict  between  the  United  States  and  a  maritime 
power,  this  throng  of  richly  laden  but  helpless  vessels  will  present  to 
the  enemy  a  noble  field  for  attack  by  the  guerre  de  course,  that  "  com- 
merce destroying"  which  first  formed  a  factor  of  naval  war  during  the 
reign  of  Elizabeth  of  England,  which  was  followed  with  such  deadly 
effect  by  the  Alabama  and  her  consorts,  and  which  has  at  this  time 
many  strong  advocates,  notably  in  the  United  States  and  France. 

Now,  Hawaii  commands  fully  this  ocean  route,  at  a  distance  from  it 
of  less  than  L',500  miles — not  five  days'  steaming  for  the  cruiser  Colum- 
bia— and  in  that  flanking  position  which  will  give  a  naval  force,  using 
it  as  a  base,  such  immense  power  to  harass  and  destroy.  The  Klon- 
dike is  Canada's;  soon  she  will,  doubtless,  lay  down  railways  reaching 
its  limits.  Great  Britain  will  then  have,  not  only  for  the  gold-lands, 
but  for  all  Alaska,  the  surpassing  stragetic  ad  vantage  of  "inner  lines" 
on  which  to  operate  in  the  event  of  war.  Alaska  is,  for  us,  practically 
an  over  sea  province;  our  sole  means  of  communication  with  it  would 
appear,  now  at  least,  to  be  an  ocean  route.  Shall  we  hazard  the  safety 
or  Seward's  imperial  territory  for  this  and  for  all  time  by  refusing 
Hawaii,  the  ocean  fortress,  which  in  our  hands,  with  an  adequate  naval 
force,  would  make  our  Alaskan  lines  of  transit  unassailable  by  any  foe? 


41S567 


32 

Hawaii's  unique  advantages  as  a  strategic  point  of  prime  importance 
have  been  set  forth  so  ably  and  so  often  as  to  forbid  their  citation  here. 
One  or  two  objections  raised  by  not  a  few  nontechnical  critics  may, 
however,  be  considered.  Pearl  Harbor  is  2,100  miles  from  our  Western 
coast  and  Madeira  is  about  the  same  distance  from  our  eastern  shore; 
the  latter  has  little,  if  any,  military  value;  why,  then,  should  Hawaii, 
parted  by  the  same  stretch  of  sea,  exceed  it  in  importance?  The  critics 
forget  that  the  paramount  worth  of  the  Hawaiian  group  in  war  will  lie, 
firstly,  in  the  fact  that  the  Pacific  is  so  broad  that  its  passage  will 
exhaust  the  coal  supply  of  a  war  vessel,  necessitating  a  renewal  at 
Honolulu ;  and,  secondly,  in  the  isolation  of  the  group,  with  the  absence 
of  other  land  between  it  and  our  coast.  If  the  Pacific  were  as  narrow  as 
the  Atlantic,  or  if  other  islands  intervened,  as  with  Madeira,  between 
our  western  shore  and  Hawaii,  the  strategic  value  of  the  latter  would 
be  largely  reduced. 

Again,  it  has  been  urged  that  if  we  shall  take  the  group  we  shall 
but  acquire  territory  to  defend;  an  element  not  of  strength,  but  of 
weakness  in  war,  and  one  which  will  necessitate  large  additions  to  our 
fleet.  Pearl  Harbor  can  be  made  an  impregnable  ocean  fortress.  It  is 
true  that  one  does  not  wage  war  with  fortresses ;  it  is  also  true,  how- 
ever, that  they  form  vantage  points  from  which  a  force  may  sally,  and 
under  whose  wing  that  force  may  supply  and  recruit  for  fresh  attack. 
If  Hawaii,  in  naval  conflict,  shall  have  no  useful  function  in  this,  then 
it  would  seem  that,  through  the  wars  of  all  time,  the  eager  strife  for  the 
possession  of  fortresses,  of  guarded  ports,  of  frontier  outposts,  has 
been  false  strategy,  an  error  militarily. 

As  to  the  dread  of  the  economist  or  of  the  Altrurian  that  annexa- 
tion will  require  largely  augmented  naval  strength,  it  may  be  said  that, 
if  an  adequate  force  of  the  United  States  be  stationed  at  Hawaii  and 
its  coast  communications  be  properly  guarded,  an  enemy  from  over- 
sea would  violate  some  of  the  cardinal  principles  of  naval  stretegy  and 
invite  sure  disaster  in  attacking  our  western  shores  without  first  block- 
ading or  defeating  the  Hawaiian  squadron.  The  force  at  Pearl  Harbor 
should  then  form  simply  but  the  first  line  of  defense;  then  the  sea- 
going ships  "  fit  to  lie  in  a  line,"  with  their  torpedo  auxiliaries,  should 
be  gathered  to  meet  the  first  assault,  leaving  the  coast  guard  to  the 
reserve  of  torpedo  craft  and  monitors  stationed  at  fortified  ports.  The 
strength  of  the  squadron  at  this  mid  Pacific  outpost  should  be  doubt- 
less sufficient  to  meet  the  enemy,  but  the  force  on  the  coast  could  be 
reduced. 

Some  misconception  as  to  Hawaii's  value  in  war  seems  to  arise 
through  a  lack  of  appreciation  of  what  steam  has  done  in  the  reduction 
of  ocean  distances,  measuring  the  latter  in  the  time  spent  in  traversing 
them.  A  clearer  view  may  be  obtained,  perhaps,  by  referring  this  time 
to  land  travel.  Admiral  Colomb  speaks  of  "  the  sea  considered  as  ter- 
ritory over  which  military  forces  march."  Let  us  extend  this  expres- 
sion somewhat  and  assume  the  ocean  to  be,  not  a  neutral  plain,  but  a 
"  No  Man's  Land,"  on  which  armies  may  maneuver.  Napoleon  gave  his 
system  of  conducting  a  war  as:  "To  march  25  miles  a  day,  to  fight, 
and  then  to  camp  in  quiet."  At  15  knots'  speed  a  fleet  could  steam 
from  Pearl  Harbor  to  San  Francisco  in  less  than  six  days.  The  Emperor, 
in  that  time,  would  have  marched  his  army  150  miles.  If,  then,  we 
assume  the  sea  to  be  a  great  land  plain,  we  must  locate  Pearl  Harbor 
on  that  plain  at  about  150  miles  from  San  Francisco,  and,  to  complete 
the  parallel,  must  make  it  practically  impregnable  and  capable  of  shel- 


33 

tering  100,000  men.     From  this  point  of  view,  Hawaii's  remoteness 
would  seem  to  be  apparent  rather  than  real. 

In  the  wars  which  gave  our  Government  birth,  and  which  have 
attended  great  crises  in  its  history,  thousands  spent  life  itself  that  a 
nation  might  be  formed  and  preserved  for  those  who  were  to  follow 
them.  The  men  of  this  generation  have  added  not  a  few  stars  to  the 
blue  field  of  our  flag.  As  captains  of  industry  or  as  toilers  in  its  ranks, 
they  have  so  developed  the  resources  of  our  wide  land  that,  after  the 
wants  of  the  greatest  home  market  in  the  world  are  filled,  there 
remains  of  our  products  a  surplus,  which,  in  ever-increasing  variety 
and  quantity,  forces  its  way  into  foreign  marts.  Shall  not  we,  too, 
serve  the  greater  Republic  that  is  to  come,  and  in  accepting  the  gift 
of  the  Hawaiian  group  not  only  make  secure  our  western  shore,  but 
give  the  coming  generations  a  firm  grasp  on  the  vast,  but  for  us 
almost  untouched,  trade  of  Pacific  shores  and  islands? 

GEO.  W.  MELVILLE, 

Engineer  in  Chief,  U.  S.  N. 

MEL 3 

O 


University  of  California 

SOUTHERN  REGIONAL  LIBRARY  FACILITY 

405  Hilgard  Avenue,  Los  Angeles,  CA  90024-1388 

Return  this  material  to  the  library 

from  which  it  was  borrowed. 


